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The United States Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act'
("FAA," "Act") in 1925, but the scope of its applicability has always
been uncertain. The FAA made written arbitration agreements in
maritime transactions and contracts "evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce" enforceable.2 While Congress probably has
the constitutional power under the commerce clause to require such
enforcement of all commercial arbitration agreements in the United
States, and to regulate the manner of their enforcement,3 it is not
clear that Congress intended the FAA to reach that far.4 Such pervasive federal regulation, moreover, would displace a substantial body
of state contract law. 5 Consequently, courts continue to differ on
when a transaction "involves" commerce such that the FAA applies.
The importance of determining the FAA's applicability has increased in recent years because judicial interpretations of the Act have
dramatically expanded federal control over commercial arbitration
agreements whenever they do "involve commerce." In addition to
holding the FAA to be substantive federal law binding in state
courts,, recent United States Supreme Court decisions have relied on

1.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).

2. Id § 2.
3. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386
(2d Cir.) (Lumbard, J., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Linda R. Hirshman,
The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305,
1315 (1985) ('Little emerges from the legislative history other than unhappiness with prior
law."); see also infra notes 32-33, 316 and accompanying text.
5. See infra part II, and notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
6. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984), discussed infra at notes

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/3

2

Strickland: The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: Wh
1992]

FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

the FAA to articulate a federal common law of arbitration that replaces state law whenever the FAA is applicable.7 Whenever an arbitration agreement "involves [interstate] commerce," therefore, federal law
now preempts state arbitration law and a significant portion of state
contract law.
Despite the importance of determining whether an arbitration
agreement "involves commerce" for purposes of the FAA, both the
Supreme Court and commentators have remained surprisingly silent
on the issue. The Supreme Court has never rendered a definitive
interpretation of the "involving commerce" language, nor provided a
standard for determining if a contract "involves" commerce. Lower
federal courts and state courts, meanwhile, have reached no consensus
on the issue. Some courts equate "involving" interstate commerce
with "affecting" interstate commerce, while other courts search for a
narrower standard.
Commentators have written extensively about the FAA and recent decisions applying it, but none focus on the interstate commerce
issue. They analyze extensively the validity of the new federal common law of arbitration and the extent to which it displaces state
arbitration and contract law when the FAA applies.8 They do not
analyze, however, how a court decides whether a contract evidences a
"transaction involving commerce" such that the FAA applies in the
first place.9 Unless the contract involves interstate commerce, neither
the FAA nor the federal common law of arbitration apply.
Litigation over the applicability of the FAA, meanwhile, appears
likely to increase. Because of the recent expansion of the federal
common law of arbitration that applies along with the FAA, differences between federal and state arbitration law have increased. Liti-

62-68 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 37 FLA. L. REv. 61 (1985); Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1305; Richard E.
Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for
Reform, 4 L DISP. RESOL. 157 (1989).
9. See, e.g., C. ALLEN FOSTER, T1E LAW & PRACTrCE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA § 1:05 (1986) (discussing the commerce issue but only briefly); GABRIEL M. WNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCiAL ARBITRATION §§ 4:05-4:06 (1991) (discussing the
expansion of the FAA both in terms of the new federal common law of arbitration and the
FAA's application in state courts, but containing very limited analysis of when a transaction
"involves" commerce); Hirshman, supra note 4 (providing insightful in-depth analysis of the
use of state law when the FAA applies, but does not analyze when the FAA applies in the
first instance); Speidel, supra note 8, at 170 (noting most courts' "expansive reading" of the
FAA's commerce requirement but noting that this reading is "not conclusive").
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gants, therefore, will seek the application of whichever law is most
favorable to their case. In addition, since state courts must now apply
the FAA, they will have to determine the FAA's applicability to
small claims, consumer transactions, and disputes between citizens of
the same state-circumstances seldom faced by federal courts."'
This Article thus examines the issue of when a contract is one
"involving commerce" under the FAA such that the contract is governed by federal law. Conversely, this Article seeks to identify commercial contracts that are not controlled by the FAA and federal law,
if any exist. Part I of this 'Article lays the groundwork for this discussion by summarizing the history of American arbitration law and the
FAA. Part II reviews the many differences and conflicts between
federal and state arbitration law. Part it then examines and analyzes
the case law that construes the FAA's "involving commerce" language. Part IV concludes that the case law on the issue creates sufficient doubt and unpredictability to spur litigation about the FAA's
application, thereby frustrating the FAA's central purpose of providing
expeditious enforcement of arbitration agreements. It then reviews and
rejects possible judicial solutions to the problem. Finally, it suggests
that a congressional amendment to the FAA is the best solution to
assure attainment of the FAA's goals, and proper consideration of the
interests and concerns embodied in state arbitration law.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW
A.

Early Arbitration and the Common Law

Merchants and commercial interests have used arbitration" to
resolve disputes for centuries.' Indeed, nearly all business disputes
in England were decided by arbitration up to the time of Lord
Mansfield. 3
10. Unlike most substantive federal statutes, the FAA creates no independent federal
question jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 25 n.32 (1983). Federal courts thus hear FAA cases only if there is diversity of citizenship among the parties or some independent grounds for federal question jurisdiction.
11. Although one can define arbitration in numerous ways, American common law
decisions provide a useful definition for studying arbitration in the United States. "Arbitration
is the submission of some disputed matter to selected persons and the substitution of their
decision or award for the judgment of the established tribunals of justice." Sabra A. Jones,
Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MiNN. L.REV.
240, 241 (1928) (quoting Castle-Curtis Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501 (1894)).
12. Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts (pts. 1 & 2), 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 238, 428 (1930-1931).
13. Id at 239. For a thorough study of early arbitration, see JULIUS H. COHEN, COM-
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Although the courts have been the primary tribunal for the resolution of business disputes since that time, many business interests
prefer private arbitration.14 They thus seek to implement arbitration
by agreement. They sometimes agree after a dispute arises to arbitrate
the dispute. More frequently, they include arbitration clauses in commercial contracts under which they agree to arbitrate disputes that
might later arise from the contractual relationship.
Despite the widespread use of arbitration and arbitration agreements among merchants and other business interests in both England
and the United States, the common law in both countries was hostile
to arbitration agreements." The courts usually enforced arbitration
awards once they were rendered, 6 but the courts refused to enforce
prospective agreements to arbitrate. 7 The result was that an agreement to arbitrate was revocable at the whim of any party until an
arbitration award was actually rendered. 8
B.

The Statutory Response

Pressure from business interests eventually brought about legislation that reversed the common law and required courts to enforce
some or all agreements to arbitrate.19 New York led the way in
1920 with a statute that declared arbitration agreements to "be valid,
enforcible [sic] and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."20 The New
York statute was an immediate success,21 and other states soon

ERCiAL ARBITRATION AND TIE LAw (1918), and Jones, supra note 11, at 241.
14. For discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, see STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG, Er AL., DIsPUT RESOLUTION: NEGO TION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES
199-207 (2d ed. 1992).
15. See Baum & Pressman, supra note 12, at 242.
16. See id at 240; Hall v. Hardy, 24 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1733).
17. See Baum & Pressman, supra note 12, at 240-42; Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1310
& n.27, and authorities cited therein.
18. See Paul L Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE LJ. 595,
598 (1924); Speidel, supra note 8, at 169 n.46; see also, e.g., Kinney v. Baltimore & 0.
Employes' Relief Ass'n, 14 S.E. 8 (W. Va. 1891); Condon v. South Side R.R. Co., 55 Va.
302 (14 Gratt. 1858); Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1310-11 & n.28 and authorities cited
therein.
19. See Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 266 (1926); Hirsbxan, supra note 4, at 1311.
20. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803 (current version as amended at
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7501-7514 (MeKinney 1980)), quoted in Hirshman, supra note
4, at 1312 & n.32; see also Cohen & Dayton, supra note 19, at 266.
21. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 19, at 266, 285.
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adopted similar legislation.'
In 1925, the United States Congress enacted what would prove
to be the country's most important legislation for commercial arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act.' The central substantive provision
of the Act, section 2, provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce 4 to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'
The FAA also provides procedures for enforcing valid arbitration
agreements. Section 3 provides for a stay of proceedings "in any of
the courts of the United States" on an issue that is subject to a valid
arbitration agreement.26 Section 4 provides procedures for obtaining
a court order to compel a recalcitrant party to proceed with arbitration
as agreed.2 7 The FAA further provides procedures for appointing
arbitrators" and issuing subpoenas to witnesses;2 9 and it provides
enforcement, 30 modification, 31
procedures and grounds for judicial
32
and annulment of arbitration awards.

22. See Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1312 & n.33, and statutes cited therein.
23. 9 U.S.C. §J 1-14 (1988). The FAA is also referred to as thde United States Arbitration Act. For a discussion of the legislative history of the FAA, see Atwood, supra note 8,
at 73-79, 102-03.
24. The Act defines 'commerce' as "commerce among the several States or with foreign

nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between
any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign
nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation . .

. ."

9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).

25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The Act excludes from its coverage, "contracta of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." Id. For additional discussion of this exception, see infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
26. Id. § 3.
27. Id. §4.
28. Id. § 5.
29. Id. § 7.
3o. id. § 9.

31. Id. § 11.
32. Id. § 10.
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C.

Erie and the FAA

Although the significance of the FAA at the date of its enact-

ment depended on the scope of its applicability, the Act was ambiguous on that point Section 2 of the Act made enforceable only those

arbitration agreements that related to maritime transactions and contracts involving interstate commerce. The Act did not specify, however, whether it applied to cases in state court as well as federal court.

Nor did it specify whether it applied to cases in federal court on
diversity of citizenship as well as federal question jurisdiction.

These questions, however, do not appear to have been controversial ones in the decade following the FAA's enactment, at least not

with respect to the FAA's central provisions making arbitration agreements valid and enforceable. Courts and commentators concluded,

almost unanimously, that the Act applied in all federal cases, including those in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.33 Few if any
commentators, meanwhile, thought that state courts were obligated to
apply the Act.'

33. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 19, at 274-78; Laura A. Kaster, Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 B.U. L. REV.
571, 578-81 (1972); see also Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp.,
293 U.S. 449 (1935) (applying § 3 of the Act to uphold a stay of litigation in a case in
federal court solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction).
The grounds for applying federal arbitration law in diversity cases varied. First, under
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), federal courts were obligated to apply only
state statutory law and decisional law of a local nature-not general state common law. In
the absence of applicable state statutes, they were free to create their own substantive rules
of decision in matters of commercial law. Id at 18. Since most states then lacked arbitration
statutes, some federal courts applied the FAA as a matter of "general law." See James F.
Nooney, Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L REv. 607, 612 (1967)
(citing Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 F. 405 (9th Cir. 1923); Michell v. Dougherty,
90 F. 639 (3d Cir. 1898); Rae v. Luzeme, 58 F.2d 829 (D.C. Pa. 1932); Jefferson Fire Ins.
Co. v.,Bierce & Sage Inc., 183 F. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1910)).
Other courts and commentators characterized the enforceability of arbitration agreements as a matter of remedies law governed by the law of the forum. See California Prune
& Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz Am. Co., 60 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1932) (refusing to apply
state arbitration statute in a diversity case on the grounds that such statutes are laws of
procedure applicable only in state courts); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 19, at 276
('[W]hether or not a contract exists is a question of the substantive law of the jurisdiction
wherein the contract was made. But whether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a question of the law of procedure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction
wherein the remedy is sought"). Under this theory, a federal forum was free to apply federal
arbitration law as a matter of federal procedure.
34. See Baum & Pressman, supra note 12, at 428, 430-31, 459-60 (noting that "[t]he
entire history and tenor of the... statute does not purport to extend its teeth to state
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The Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 35 however, forced a reexamination of the FAA's scope
and the authority under which Congress enacted it. Erie ended the
power of federal courts to make substantive rules of decision in diversity cases, and cast doubt on Congress' power to do so. 6 If the
FAA were deemed to regulate substantive contract rights, therefore,
Erie arguably precluded its application in diversity cases. Erie thus
threatened to gut the FAA of its effectiveness. If the FAA did not
apply in state courts, and under Erie, could not apply in diversity
cases in federal courts, the Act was all but meaningless.

The courts struggled for decades to determine the scope of the
FAA's applicability and the impact of Erie. Under Erie, the scope of
the FAA's applicability depended on the constitutional authority under
which Congress enacted the statute. If Congress, relying on its Article
III power over practice in the federal courts, sought to provide either
a rule of procedure or a substantive rule of decision applicable only
in the federal courts, then the FAA applied only in federal court. The
constitutionality of applying such a rule in diversity cases-although
likely under later cases37 -was uncertain in the decades following
Erie.3" If, on the other hand, the FAA was a substantive measure
enacted pursuant to Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce,
then the Act likely applied in all state and federal cases.39 That resuit, however, would run contrary to the apparently unanimous perception at the time of the statute's enactment that it did not apply in
state courts.40 Since Congress passed the FAA a decade before Erie
proceedings" and that no attempts at that time had been made to invoke the FAA in state
court); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 19, at 274-78; Speidel, supra note 8, at 169. Commentators believed that Congress had the power under the commerce clause to require state
courts to enforce arbitration agreements in contracts evidencing interstate commerce, but they
did not think the FAA did so. See Baum & Pressman, supra note 12, at 459-60; Cohen &
Dayton, supra note 19, at 277-78; Speidel, supra note 8, at 169.
35. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

36. Id.; see also Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382,
386 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, L, concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); John Hart Ely,
The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L REV. 693, 699, 706 (1974).
37. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Ely, supra note 36.
38. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 208 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("[lit would raise a serious question of constitutional law whether Congress could
subject to arbitration litigation in the federal courts which is there solely because it is
'between Citizens of different States, in disregard of the law of the State in which a federal
court is sitting." (citation omitted)).
39. For further analysis of the possible implications of Erie for the FAA, see Hirshman,
supra note 4, at 1313-24.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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was decided, moreover, Congress did not specify the constitutional
source of its authority to enact the FAA.41 Consequently, more than
forty years passed before the Supreme Court resolved these issues.
The United States Supreme Court first confronted these issues in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc.42 That case arose
from an employment contract in which the parties agreed to arbitrate
"any differences, claim or matter in dispute arising between them out
of this agreement or connected herewith. . . ."43 After Polygraphic
discharged Bernhardt, Bernhardt filed a lawsuit alleging that Polygraphic had breached its employment contract. Polygraphic sought to
stay the action pending arbitration.
The district court and the court of appeals struggled to analyze
the arbitration issue under Erie and reached different conclusions. The
district court said that, under Erie and Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. York, a federal court sitting in diversity must reach the
same result as a court of the state in which it sits.4" Since Vermont
courts would apply Vermont common law to deny the stay,' a federal court must do the same, the FAA notwithstanding. The district
court thus applied Vermont law and denied Polygraphic's motion to
stay the action pending arbitration. 47 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed.48 It held that "a stay, pursuant to Section 3 of the
[FAA] is not 'substantive' within the meaning of Erie"49' and thus
should apply in diversity cases even in the face of contrary state law.'

41. See Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1314-15 & nn.52-53. "Little emerges from the
legislative history other than unhappiness with prior law." Id. at 1315.
42. 122 F. Supp. 733 (D. Vt. 1954), rev'd, 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956).
43. Bernhardt, 218 F.2d at 949. For additional details about the contract and discussion
of the interstate commerce issue, see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
44. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
45. Bernhardt, 122 F. Supp. 733.

46. "The common law rule [inVermont] is that an agreement to submit an issue to
arbitration is not binding and is revocable at any time before an award is actually made by

arbitrators." I at 734-35 (citing Mead v. Owen, 74 A. 1058 (Vt. 1910)).
47. Id. at 735.
48. Bernhardt, 218 F.2d 948.
49. Id. at 951. The Second Circuit relied on Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co.,
146 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1944), in which Judge Learned Hand wrote, "Arbitration is
merely a form of trial, to be adopted in the action itself, in place of the trial at common
law: it is like a reference to a master, or an 'advisory trial' under [the] Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." Id
50. The Second Circuit statedSection 3 applies whether or not the agreement is of a kind covered by Sec. 2,
i.e., for purposes of Sec. 3, the agreement need not involve a maritime transaction
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The Supreme Court interpreted the FAA in such a way as to
avoid deciding the difficult issues surrounding the application of Erie
to the FAA. The Court ruled that section 3 of the FAA, which concerns stays pending arbitration, applies only to arbitration agreements

governed by section 2, agreements in maritime transactions, and transactions in interstate commerce. Since the contract before the Court
did not involve a maritime transaction nor interstate commerce, the
FAA was inapplicable by its own terms.51 The Court interpreted the
statute this way expressly to avoid deciding whether application of
the FAA in a diversity case was unconstitutional under Erie.5 2
The Court next confronted the application of Erie to the FAA in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.53 That
case arose from a contract under which Prima Paint purchased Flood
& Conklin's ("F&C") paint business. In connection with the purchase,
the parties entered a consulting agreement under which F&C agreed
to advise and assist Prima Paint in servicing customer accounts and in
moving manufacturing operations from New Jersey to Maryland.'
The consulting agreement contained a provision requiring arbitration
of "[amny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the]

or interstate or foreign commerce. The power to enact Sec. 3 derives from Article
M1,Section 2 of the Constitution.
Bernhardt, 218 F.2d at 951.
51. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956); see also infra
notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
52. The Court statedIf respondent's contention [that § 3 applies in a diversity case in the absence of a
maritime transaction or a transaction involving interstate commerce] is correct, a
constitutional question might be presented. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that
Congress does not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases ....
[The Court has not
previously considered] whether arbitration touched on substantive rights, which Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins held were governed by local law, or was a mere form of
procedure within the power of the federal courts or Congress to prescribe. Our
view, as will be developed, is that § 3, so read, would invade the local law field.
We therefore read § 3 narrowly to avoid that issue.
Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202 (citation omitted). The Court went on to conclude that federal
courts could not enforce arbitration agreements as a matter of federal common law in diversity cases. Noting that the enforcement of a contract is a state-created right, the Court held
that a "federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity c
... may not 'substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.'" Id. at 203 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)). Concluding that arbitration "substantially affects the cause of action created by the State," the Court held that state law must
apply, at least in the absence of an applicable federal statute. Id.
53. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
54. Id at 397, 401.
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Agreement." 5 When a dispute later arose concerning performance of
the consulting agreement and an allegation that the contract had been
fraudulently induced, Prima Paint filed an action in court. F&C responded by filing a motion to stay the action pending arbitration. The
district court stayed the action, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the stay. It first held that the contract fell within the coverage of the FAA because it involved interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute.56 Having found
that the terms of the FAA covered Prima Paint's contract, the Court
had to decide whether the Act could be constitutionally applied under
Erie in the face of contrary state law. 7 Relying on legislative history, the Court decided that Congress had enacted the FAA pursuant to
its Article I power over interstate commerce and admiralty-not its
Article III power over the federal courts.5 The Court thus concluded
that the case and indeed the FAA did not raise the issue of whether
Congress could prescribe substantive rules of decision for cases simply on the basis of their being in federal court. "Rather," the Court
said, "the question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter [such
as interstate commerce] over which Congress plainly has power to
legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative." 59 Prima
Paint thus laid to rest any doubt about the FAA's applicability in
federal court-even in diversity cases-by holding that the FAA was
enacted as a substantive regulation of interstate commerce.
D. The FAA in State Courts
The logical implication of that holding was that the FAA also
applied in state courts, 6 and indeed many state courts began applying the FAA after the Prima Paint decision.61 Other state courts,

55. Id. at 398.
56. Id. at 401; see also infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
57. The Court stated that New York law was not clear regarding whether the court or
an arbitrator should decide claims of fraud in the inducement, but avoided that determination
by deciding that the FAA controlled the issue. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400 n.3.
58. Id. at 405.
59. Id.

60. Congressional legislation regulating interstate commerce typically is binding on state
governments and state courts. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984); Prima
Paint, 388 U.S. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting).
61. Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1325-26. Professor Hirshman notes that 'a substantial
number of state courts held that they were bound to apply the FAA," while others "noted the
desirability of compelling arbitration under the FAA to ease court congestion and to avoid
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however, refused to apply the FAA, ruling that the holding in Prima
Paint was limited to federal diversity cases.62
Finally in 1984, nearly sixty years after Congress enacted the
FAA, the Supreme Court resolved these issues. It held in Southland
Corp. v. Keating63 that state courts must apply the central provisions
of the FAA." Citing Prima Paint and Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,65 the Court reaffirmed its
view that the FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law" based
on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 66 When Congress exercises its authority to regulate commerce, the Court said, "it
normally creates rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal
courts."67 Admitting that the FAA's legislative history on the issue
is ambiguous, the Court nonetheless determined that Congress intended the central provisions68 of the FAA to apply in state courts. 69
Prima Paint and Southland thus federalized the law of arbitration
by establishing the FAA as the generally applicable substantive law of
arbitration in the United States. The scope of the FAA's applicability
now depends entirely on the terms of the FAA itself. If the FAA by
the forum shopping that would ensue if a different rule prevailed in state and federal courts."
Id. at 1326. For a sampling of the cases reaching these conclusions, see id. at 1326 nn.12224.
62. Id. at 1326-27 & n.125, and cases cited therein.
63. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
64. Id. at 10-16.
65. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Relying on Prima Paint's characterization of the FAA as a
substantive regulation of interstate commerce, the Court stated in Moses H. Cone that the
FAA governs the issue of arbitrability "in either state or federal court." Id. at 24. Like Prima
Paint, however, Moses H. Cone was a federal diversity case so the Court's statement regarding application of the FAA in state courts still was technically dicta. Some state courts thus
continued to refuse to apply the FAA. See Ex parte Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 433 So. 2d
1158, 1161-67 (Ala. 1983).
66. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 & n.32).
67. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting)).
68. The Court expressly held that only § 2 of the Act, which makes arbitration agreements valid, enforceable contracts, is binding on state courts. "In holding that the Arbitration
Act pre-empts a state law that withdraws the power to enforce arbitration agreements, we do
not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts. Section
4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in proceedings to
compel arbitration. The Federal Rules do not apply in such state-court proceedings." Id. at 16
n.10.
69. For persuasive arguments that the FAA's legislative history evidences congressional
intent to apply the FAA only in federal courts, see id. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
For analysis of both the majority and the dissenting opinions on this point, see Hirshman,
supra note 4, at 1343-46. For additional analysis of the legislative history, see Atwood, supra
note 8, at 73-79.
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its terms applies to an agreement to arbitrate, then it preempts conflicting state law."
E. The Expanding Federal Common Law of Arbitration
Even after determining that the FAA governs a particular arbitration agreement, courts must decide a variety of issues not directly
addressed by the Act. Arbitration agreements, after all, are simply
contracts, and the substantive portion of the FAA on its face does
little more than require these contracts to be enforced as all other
contracts. Attempts to enforce or to circumvent arbitration agreements,
therefore, raise a host of contract issues regardless of the applicability
of the FAA. If the agreement is governed by the FAA, courts must
decide whether state law should govern these issues or whether the
FAA requires the fashioning of a federal common law of arbitration
to govern these issues. Increasingly, the Supreme Court has fashioned
its own federal common law based on either the language of the FAA
or the policies implicit in the FAA.7 This common law preempts inconsistent state law whenever the FAA applies.
The Supreme Court first joined this trend in Prima Paint. After
finding the FAA applicable in that case,' the Court relied on the
statute's language to adopt the doctrine of separability despite possible
conflict with state law. Some state courts and some lower federal
courts had held that claims of fraud in the inducement must be decided by a court rather than an arbitrator, despite the existence of an
arbitration clause. If the contract containing the arbitration clause was
fraudulently induced, these courts reasoned, then the entire contract-including the agreement to arbitrate-was void. The defrauded
party should not be compelled to arbitrate, they said, because that
party did not really agree to arbitrate. Relying on language in the
FAA, however, the Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement
73 If a
should be treated separate from the contract containing it.
claim of fraud is addressed to the arbitration provision specifically;
the Court said, then the arbitration agreement is potentially void and
that claim of fraud must be decided by the court before the court can
70. One exception to this rule is state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance. See infra notes 300-24 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act on the FAA).
71. For analysis and criticism of this expanding federal common law of arbitration, see
generally Atwood, supra note 8; Hirsbman, supra note 4.
72. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
73. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04.
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order arbitration. If, on the other hand, a claim of fraud is addressed
to the contract as a whole, then the arbitration provision must be
enforced under the FAA, and the arbitrator must decide the fraud
claim.74
The Court substantially expanded this federal common law and
its displacement of state law in a series of cases in the 1980s.7 5 One
of the most important of these cases was Southland Corp. v.
Keating.76 That case arose from a franchise contract that contained
an arbitration provision. The franchisees filed an action in state court
alleging fraud, breach of contract, and violation of the California
Franchise Investment Law.' The California Supreme Court held that
all of the claims had to be submitted to arbitration except for the
statutory claim.7' The California court construed the Franchise Investment Law to require claims made under it to be asserted in court
rather than in arbitration. 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA
preempted the state court's interpretation of the California Franchise
Investment Law. State law, the Court decided, cannot prevent arbitra-

74. Id.
75. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983). For a thorough discussion of these cases and the Court's dramatic expansion
of the FAA in the early 1980s, see Hirshaman, supra note 4. In the later 1980s and into the
1990s, the Court further held that virtually all federal statutory claims are arbitrable under the
FAA unless Congress expressly forbids their arbitration. See Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (reversing 36-year-old precedent by
holding that agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 must be
enforced under the FAA); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (holding that claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are arbitrable);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that
claims arising under the Sherman Act are arbitrable, at least when they relate to an interna-

tional transaction).
76. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
77. The California statute provided: "Any person who offers or sells, a franchise in
violation of [the substantive provisions of this Act] shall be liable to the franchisee or subfranchisor, who may sue for damages caused thereby...." CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300
(West 1992).
78. See Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982) (en
bane), appeal dismissed in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984).
79. The statute provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this
law.., is void." CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1992). The California Supreme Court
construed that provision to require judicial resolution of claims made pusuant to the statute
despite the existence of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement. Keating, 645 P.2d at 11981200.
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tion of a claim that is subject to an arbitration agreement governed
by the FAA-even if the claim is created by state statute."0 Therefore, as Professor Hirshman has written,
Mhe preemptive effect of the FAA after Southland is not confined
to state law based on historic, across-the-board hostility to arbitration: it displaces all state law limiting arbitration regardless of the
underlying policy. Second, defenses directed to the formation of the
arbitration agreement are treated after Southland in the same way as
other grounds for revocation under section 2. Accordingly, state-law
restrictions on contracting for arbitration are no more immune to the
impact of the FAA than restrictions on enforcement of the arbitration agreement ......
The expansion of the federal common law of arbitration is even
more dramatic in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 2 That case arose from a construction contract that
contained an arbitration clause. The contractor, Mercury Construction
("Mercury") believed that the Hospital, the owner of the project, was
liable under the contract for various delay costs. The Hospital filed a
declaratory judgment action in state court seeking a declaration (1)
that Mercury "had lost any right to arbitration under the contract due
to waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for
arbitration"; 3 and (2) that the Hospital was not liable to Mercury
for the alleged delay costs. Mercury responded by filing an action in
federal district court seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement
pursuant to the FAA. The federal district court stayed the action
pending resolution of the Hospital's state declaratory judgment acs4
tion.
The Supreme Court held that the stay was erroneous. One of the
factors on which the Court based its decision was the role federal law
played in the decision on the merits. 5 "Federal law in the terms of
the Arbitration Act," the Court said, "governs [the issue of
arbitrability] in either state or federal court."8 6 Even though the FAA
does not address issues of timeliness, waiver, and laches, the Court
indicated federal law governs even those issues. The Court stated:

80.

See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.

81.

Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1350.

82.

460 U.S. 1 (1983).

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 23-26.
Id. at 24.
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The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrabilityY
Moses H. Cone thus confirmed two principles:
First, the FAA embodies a federal policy favoring arbitration that is
not confined to the express language of the Act. Second, federal
courts may decide issues not expressly covered by the FAA by
crafting a federal common law rule even if the otherwise applicable
state law does not discriminate against arbitration."
Although the continued role of state law in FAA cases is not yet
clear, these cases make it apparent that the role of state law and
policy is extremely limited. Southland indicates that "state law will
provide [at most] neutral rules of contract formation and enforcement
addressed... to the arbitration clause." 9 Moses H. Cone indicates
that even these neutral rules of contract law may be displaced by
federal rules deemed more favorable to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.9'
II.

CURRENT CoNFLICrs BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW

As a result of the Supreme Court's expansion of the FAA, the
determination of whether a particular arbitration agreement falls within the terms of the FAA has grown increasingly important. Based on
the authority suggested in Southland and Moses H. Cone, federal
courts have articulated federal rules of contract and arbitration law on
a wide array of issues. The result is a significant body of federal
arbitration law-statutory and decisional-that is in some instances
significantly different from state arbitration and contract law. Consequently, while an increasing number of states have passed modem
arbitration statutes that adopt the FAA's underlying policy of promoting and enforcing arbitration agreements,9 federal and state law

87. Id at 24-25.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1347.
Id at 1378.
See id.
See WilMNER, supra note 9, at 28 & app. I.
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have diverged on a variety of more specific issues. An exhaustive list
of these differences and the possible differences that may arise in the
future is beyond the scope of this Article. A sampling of these conflicts, however, demonstrates both the wide array of issues on which
the new federal arbitration law differs from state law and the significance these differences could have on the outcome of attempts to
enforce or avoid agreements to arbitrate.
The most obvious conflict between federal and state arbitration
law arises in those states that still deem arbitration agreements unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Although nearly all states now
accept and promote arbitration in some or most contract disputes,'
three states still embrace the common law hostility toward arbitration
and will enforce arbitration agreements only if the FAA applies.9 3 In
those states, the determination of whether the FAA applies determines
outright the enforceability of any arbitration agreement.'
Many other states, while accepting and enforcing arbitration
agreements generally, specifically preclude enforcement of arbitration
agreements in certain types of contracts. The Georgia Arbitration
Code" enacted in 1988, for example, liberally provides for the enforcement of "[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit any

92. See id. at 28. For a periodically updated list of the states that enforce arbitration
agreements under state law, see FOSTER, supra note 9, at 5 n.5. For a periodically updated
chart summarizing state arbitration statutes, see WILNRt, supra note 9, at app. L
93. At present, it appears that only Alabama, Mississippi, and Nebraska continue to hold
arbitration agreements to be generally unenforceable absent application of the FAA. Alabama
adheres to the old common law rule that all pre-dispute arbitration agreements are void as
against public policy. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1984) (providing that an arbitration
agreement cannot be specifically enforced); Es parte Clements, 587 So. 2d 317, 319 (Ala.
1991) ("[U]nless the FAA is applicable, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are void in Alabama as against public policy."). Mississippi also takes that position, see McClendon v. Shutt,
115 So. 2d 740 (Miss. 1959), except for disputes arising from construction contracts, see
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-15-101 (Supp. 1992) (providing for enforcement of arbitration agree-

ments in contracts "for the planning, design, engineering, construction, erection, repair or
alteration of any building, structure, fixture, road, highway, [or] utility" and in supply contracts relating to those contracts). Although Nebraska adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act,
see NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622 (1989), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
the act violated the Nebraska Constitution, see State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees,
477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1991) (holding the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act violates the
Nebraska Constitution to the extent that it requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
future disputes); John M. Gradwohl, Arbitrability in Nebraska, 70 NEa. L. REV. 381, 408-11
(1991).
94. See Clements, 587 So. 2d at 319.
95. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to 9-9-43 (Supp. 1992).
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controversy thereafter arising to arbitration."" Yet the Georgia statute excludes from its coverage arbitration agreements relating to contracts of insurance, loan agreements and consumer financing
agreements involving $25,000.00 or less, contracts for the purchase of
consumer goods, contracts involving consumer transactions, and agreements to arbitrate future tort claims arising out of personal injury or
wrongful deathY' These and other exceptions are common in state
arbitration statutes.9" Arbitration agreements subject to these exclu-

sions are unenforceable unless they fall within the coverage of the
FAA." In those instances, the determination of whether the FAA
applies again determines outright the enforceability of the arbitration

96. Id. § 9-9-3.
97. Id. § 9-9-2(c)(3), (5), (6), (7), & (10). Section 9-9-2 also excludes agreements
relating to arbitration of medical malpractice claims, which are regulated by a separate,
specialized statute. Id. § 9-9-2(c)(1); see also id. §§ 9-9-60 to 9-9-84 (providing procedures
for arbitration of medical malpractice claims). It also requires that arbitration provisions in
certain types of contracts must be separately initialed at the time of the contract's execution
in order to be enforceable. See id. § 9-9-2(c)(8) (sales agreements or loan agreements for the
purchase or financing of residential real estate between parties other than real estate brokers
or agents); Id. § 9-9-2(c)(9) ("contracts relating to terms and conditions of employment").
98. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (1982) (providing for enforcement of arbitration agreements except for "arbitration agreements between employers and employees or their
respective representatives"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie 1987) (excluding "personal injury or tort matters, employer-employee disputes," and claims by "any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1(b) (West
defined in the
1983) (excluding "all consumer leases, sales, and loan contracts, as ...
Uniform Consumer Credit Code); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2)(a) & (b) (West 1987)
(excluding contracts of adhesion, contracts between employers and employees, and some tort
claims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1986 Supp.) (excluding contracts of insurance, contracts
between employers and employees, and contracts providing for arbitration of tort claims); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (excluding insurance contracts and
arbitration agreements between employers and employees); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4216
(West 1991) (excluding 'contracts of employment of labor"); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD.
PRoc. § 3-206(b) (1989) (excluding agreements between employers and employees); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (Vernon 1992) (excluding arbitration agreements in contracts of insurance and contracts of adhesion); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (1991) (excluding agreements
to arbitrate disputes arising after the arbitration agreement is made when the dispute relates
to: () claims arising from personal injury; (ii) contracts by individuals for the acquisition of
property, services, or credit where the total consideration furnished by the individual is $5,000
or less; (ii) agreements concerning insurance policies or annuity contracts other than those
between insurance companies; and (iv) claims for workers' compensation); NED. REV. STAT. §
25-2602 (1989) (excluding adhesion contracts, claims arising out of personal injury, and
claims for workers compensation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Anderson 1992)
(excluding certain disputes concerning title to land); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Coop. 1976 & Supp. 1991) (excluding workers compensation claims, certain claims arising from
lawyer-client and doctor-patient relationships, personal injury claims, and claims under any
insurance policy or annuity contract).
99. See Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1986).
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403

agreement. to

Even when states provide for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, details of state law often conflict with federal law. One
such area of conflict concerns the formation of a valid agreement or
contract to arbitrate. Unlike the FAA, "[a] number of states impose
special requirements on the formation of arbitration agree-

ments-presumably to guard against 'surprise' and to insure that
consent to arbitration has been knowing and informed.1

°!

These in-

clude requirements that arbitration provisions include certain Ianguage,' °

that they appear in a certain size of type,"0 3 that they be

separately initialed,"° and even that they be signed by both the parties and the parties' attorneys.0

Arbitration agreements that do not

100. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1124 (Ist Cir. 1989)
(holding that in contracts involving interstate commerce, the FAA preempts state law providing that arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion are unenforceable), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 956 (1990); Webb, 800 F.2d at 806-07 (holding that in a transaction involving interstate
commerce, the FAA preempts a state law provision that arbitration agreements in contracts of
adhesion are unenforceable).
101. JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 453 (1989).
102. See VT. STAT. ANN. tiL12, § 5652(b) (1991) (enforcing arbitration provision only if
it contains a prominently displayed notice in the form prescribed by the statute); see also R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (enforcing arbitration provisions in insurance
contracts only if the provision is placed immediately above the parties' signatures); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991) (enforcing certain arbitration
agreements only if the arbitration provision appears prominently on the first page of the
contract).
103. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1548-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1991) (requiring that
notice of arbitration provision be placed prominently on first page of the contract in underlined capital letters or with a rubber stamp).
104. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1 (West 1987) (enforcing agreements to arbitrate tort
claims only if contained in a separate writing executed by the parties); TENN. CODE. ANN. §
29-5-302 (1992) (enforcing arbitration agreements relating to farm property and residential
property only if the arbitration provision is separately signed by the parties); VT.STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 5652(b) (1991) (enforcing arbitration agreements only if the contract is accompanied
by a separate acknowledgment or the contract contains a prominently displayed acknowledgment on the i-st page).
105. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224(b) & (c) (West 1993). These subsections
exclude from the Texas Uniform Arbitration Act:
(b) any contract for the acquisition by an individual person or persons . . .
of real or personal property, or services, or money or credit where the total consideration therefor to be paid or furnished by the individual is $50,000 or less,
unless said individual and the other party or parties agree in writing to submit to
arbitration and such written agreement is signed by the parties to such agreement
and their attorneys;
(c) any claim for personal injury except upon the advice of counsel to both
parties as evidenced by a written agreement signed by counsel to both parties.
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comply with these requirements are unenforceable.'0 6 If they fall
within the FAA's coverage, however, then the FAA preempts these
and compels enforcement of the arbitration
state law requirements
7
agreements.1

Another difference between state and federal arbitration law
relating to the formation of a valid arbitration agreement arises from
the "battle of the forms" problem. In the arbitration context, this
problem most commonly arises when a merchant makes an offer on a
form that does not contain an arbitration provision, and the offeree
accepts the offer or confirms acceptance using a form that does contain an arbitration provision."' This exchange of inconsistent forms
is governed by section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which provides that the additional terms in the acceptance or confirmation become part of the contract unless they materially alter it. 9
Some state courts have held that the addition of an arbitration provision is a "per se material alteration" of the contract regardless of the

Id
106. See, e.g., Donahue v. Assoc. Indem. Corp., 227 A.2d 187 (R.I. 1967) (voiding an
arbitration provision in an insurance contract because it was not located immediately above
the testimonium clause as required by Rhode Island law, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (1956
version)); Withers-Busby Group v. Surety Indem., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 198 (rex. Civ. App.
1976) (holding that an arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was not signed by
the parties' attorneys as required by TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (West 1973)); Ioder
Bldg. Corp. v. Lewis, 569 A.2d 471 (VL 1989) (holding that an arbitration provision that
was not in bold face or underlined as required by VT. CODE § 5652(b) was unenforceable).
107. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that the FAA preempts the state requirement that arbitration clauses in pre-dispute
arbitration agreements between broker dealers and their customers be conspicuously brought to
the attention of customers and explained in writing regarding their legal effect), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 956 (1990); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the FAA preempts the state statutory requirement that all arbitration provisions
be accompanied by a notice, in ten point capital letters and that the contract contains a binding arbitration provision); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995 (8th Cir.
1972) (holding that the FAA preempts the state statutory requirement that an arbitration
agreement be signed by the" parties' attorneys); Bunge Corp. v. Perryville Feed & Produce,
Inc., 685 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1985) (holding that when it applies, the FAA preempts a state
statute requiring inclusion of a special notice that the contract contains an arbitration provision); Godwin v. Stanley Smith & Sons, 386 S.E.2d 464, 467 (S.C. CL App. 1989) (holding
that the arbitration provision was enforceable under the FAA even though it was not printed
in the type prescribed by S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976)); Withers-Busby
Group, 538 S.W.2d 198 (holding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it
was not signed by the parties' attorneys as required by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 224
(Vernon 1973)).
108. See Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1357. For a survey of cases addressing this problem, see id at 1357-60 nn.331-48.
109. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1990).
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factual context and thus does not become part of the contract. 110
The "per se material alteration" rule, however, conflicts with the FAA
and the new federal common law of arbitration, because it treats
arbitration provisions less favorably than other contract provisions that
might be added in confirmation forms."' If the FAA applies, therefore, the FAA will likely preempt the state rule and will require a
more neutral application of section 2-207.112
Another conflict relating to the formation of a valid arbitration
agreement arises when a party claims that a contract containing an
arbitration provision was fraudulently induced. 3 As discussed
above, the United States Supreme Court held in Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co." 4 that an arbitration provision
is deemed separate from the larger contract that contains it. Consequently, the Court held that the agreement to arbitrate is not void
even if the container contract was fraudulently induced. Under the
FAA, therefore, a claim of fraud in the inducement must be submitted
to arbitration unless the alleged fraud was directed specifically to the
arbitration provision. Some states, however, reject this doctrine of
separability.1 These states hold that a fraudulently induced contract

110. See e.g., Supak & Sons Mfg. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding that the addition of an arbitration provision is a per se material alteration under
either New York or North Carolina law); Marlene Indus. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d
239 (N.Y. 1978).
111. Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1357-60. Cf. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883
F.2d 1114, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989):
Massachusetts could . . . pass legislation declaring all contracts of adhesion presumptively unenforceable .... Such a rule would apply to arbitration contracts,
among others. But Massachusetts may not say (judicially, legislatively, or in a
regulatory mode) that "adhesion contracts are especially bad when arbitration is
included, so we will therefore ban, or place gyves and shackles upon, only those
adhesive contracts which contain arbitration clauses." That kind of value judgment
is foreclosed precisely because the FAA ordains that the state's appulse toward
arbitration agreements must be the same as its approach to contracts generally.
Id (citation omitted).
112. See id. But see Supak & Sons, 593 F.2d at 136-37 (the FAA does not displace
state law rulings that arbitration provisions are per se material for purposes of U.C.C. § 2207).
113. Parties claiming fraud argue that the entire contract-including the agreement to
arbitrate-is void as a result of the fraud. Since the arbitration agreement is void, they argue,
their claim of fraud must be decided by the court. It would be unfair, they argue, to require
the fraud claim to be decided by an arbitrator when the agreement to submit the matter to
the arbitrator was void on account of fraud.
114. 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967).
115. See George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 884-86
(La. 1977); Thayer v. American Fin. Advisors, Inc. 322 N.W.2d 599, 602-03 (Minn. 1982);
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is voidable in its entirety-including any arbitration provision."'
Under the law of those states, therefore, any party claiming that a
contract was fraudulently induced may have that claim decided in
court rather than arbitration." 7 If the FAA applies, however, it
would require the same claim to be submitted to arbitration.
Even if state and federal law agree that a valid arbitration agreement exists, federal law still may differ from state law in the standards to be applied in interpreting an arbitration agreement and the
scope of the parties' agreement. Although standards of contract interpretation would appear to be a matter of general and neutral state
contract law that would be applicable even under the FAA, federal
courts frequently hold that "federal law governs the question of
whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate.""' The Supreme Court
stated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.:119

[Tihe

first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute
is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.
The court is to make this determination by applying the "federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the [Federal Arbitration] Act." And that
body of law counsels "that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration .... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
[some] defense to arbitrability."120
This federal presumption of arbitrability may be subtly different from

Fouquette v. Fust Am. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 464 N.W.2d 760, 762-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991);
Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group Leasing Co., 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
116. See, e.g., George Engine Co., 350 So. 2d at 885-86.
117. See iaL For a survey of cases concerning the arbitrability of fraud in the inducement
claims, see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claim of Fraud in the Inducement of Contract as
Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Clause Contained in Contract, 11 A.L.R.4th 774 (1982).
Although some earlier New York cases apparently rejected the doctrine of separability, see,
e.g., Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 174 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 1961), New York has adopted
the doctrine. See, e.g., Information Sciences, Inc. v. Mohawk Data Science Corp., 374 N.E.2d
624, 625 (N.Y. 1978).
118. In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1983).
119. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
120. Id. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (citations omitted)).
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state law standards of contract interpretation.
Federal law also differs from that of some states in the remedies
available in arbitration. Some states prohibit arbitrators from awarding
punitive damages and will not enforce arbitration awards that include
punitive damages."' Federal law contains no such prohibition."
In transactions governed by the FAA, federal law will likely preempt
state law prohibitions on the award of coercive sanctions in arbitra3

tion.1

Federal law also differs from state law in the availability of
defenses to arbitration and the standards governing those defenses.
These differences are evident in the courts' treatment of claims that a
party has waived its right to compel arbitration. Under both state and
federal law, some level of participation in court proceedings will result in a ruling that a party waived its right to arbitration. 4 Some
state courts hold that a party waives the right to arbitrate an issue

121. Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1360-61; see also Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoc., 698 P.2d
880, 882 (N.M. 1985); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976);
Anderson v. Nichols, 359 S.E.2d 117, 121 n.1 (W. Va. 1987); FOSTER, supra note 9, § 5:06,
at 158, and cases cited therein. For a criticism of this rule, see Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Punitive Damages in Arbitration, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv.
953 (1986).
122. See Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 9-12 (Ist Cir.
1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1988);
Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 360 (N.D. Ala.
1984), aftd, 776 F.2d 269, 270 (11th Cir. 1985); Hlrsihman, supra note 4, at 1361-63; cf.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635-36 (upholding arbitration as an appropriate forum
for the award of treble damages pursuant to the Sherman Act in an international transaction).
123. See Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1361-63; accord Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 (holding
that choice of law provision does not deprive arbitrators of their power to award punitive
damages); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., 598 F. Supp. at 358-59. Professor Hirshman
states:
Section 2 of the FAA... guarantees the parties' right to bargain for an arbitration forum ....
[Tihe policy underlying New York's attempt to retain a public
monopoly on the use of coercive sanctions-the superiority of court adjudica-

tion-is identical to the policy underlying the old common-law prohibition on
arbitration ousting the courts of their jurisdiction.
Hlrshman, supra note 4, at 1361. It is such hostility toward arbitration that the FAA sought
to end. Id.
As Professor Hirshman notes, the dispute over an arbitrator's award of punitive
damages usually arises only after arbitration is completed and the parties seek enforcement or
review of the award. She notes, however, that § 10 of the FAA limits the judicial review of
awards and that these "limits on judicial review in section 10 should generally preclude
application of the New York rule." Id at 1362.
124. See Fraser v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817 F.2d 250, 252 (4th
Cir. 1987); DeSapio v. Kohimeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770, 772 (N.Y. 1974); MURRAY ET AL.,
supra note 101, at 565-70.
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when that party's participation in a lawsuit "manifests an affirmative
acceptance of the judicial forum."" These courts focus on the actions of the party alleged to have waived the right to arbitrate. Based
on his or her own actions a party in those states may waive the right
to arbitrate, even if that party's actions are not prejudicial to the party
opposing arbitration.12 6 Courts applying the FAA, meanwhile, must
take a different approach. 7 "Under the Federal policy favoring arbitration, a party does not automatically waive arbitration merely by
engaging in pleading and discovery activities. More is required than
action inconsistent with the arbitration provision; prejudice to the
party opposing arbitration must also be shown.' n1 1 The determination of whether the FAA governs an arbitration agreement, therefore,
dramatically affects claims that a party has waived its contractual
right to arbitration.
Another potential conflict between federal and state arbitration
law, relates to the application of statutes of limitation to claims asserted in arbitration. Given the federal policy favoring arbitration,
federal courts applying the FAA have held that absent contractual
intent to the contrary, issues relating to timeliness, statutes of limita-

125. DeSapio, 321 N.E.2d at 772.
126. See id
127. See MURRAY Er AL., supra note 101, at 567.
128. David v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 269, 274 (N.D.
1989) (citations omitted), quoted in WILNER, supra note 9, at § 19:01; see also Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) ("The Arbitration
Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration [when] the problem at hand is . . . an allegation of waiver [or] delay."); Fraser, 817 F.2d at 252 (holding that a finding of prejudice is
required before a party may be deemed to have waived its right to invoke the FAA); Maxum
Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 1985) ("A litigant may waive
its right to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act by so substantially utilizing the litigation machinery that to subsequently permit arbitration would prejudice the party opposing the stay.");
MURRAY Er AL, supra note 101, at 567. Professors Murray, Rau, and Sherman state in their
text,
Given the "strong federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements
between knowledgeable business people," a finding of waiver is not favored in
federal court; the party asserting it bears a heavy burden of proof.
Federal courts therefore tend to ask whether one of the parties will have
been "prejudiced" if his adversary is permitted to take part in litigation and then
later demand arbitration ....
Without such a finding of "prejudice," the fact that a party has delayed in
calling for arbitration will not be enough to cause a waiver to his right to arbitrate.
Id. (quoting Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 489, 491 (N.D. I1. 1983))

(citations omitted).
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tion, and laches should be addressed to and decided by the arbitrator-not a court."' The arbitrator then has substantial discretion to
rule on such claims as he or she sees fit, and the arbitrator's ruling is
effectively unreviewable.1" New York, meanwhile, has a statute that
permits a party to apply to the court to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to arbitration."' Consequently, determining whether
the FAA or state law governs the arbitration agreement again has a
substantial impact on the parties' right and obligation to submit their
dispute to arbitration.132
Finally, federal and state law may differ about the standard of
review courts should apply to arbitration awards. The Second Circuit
summarized such a conflict with Pennsylvania law as follows:
Despite limited review of the merits, federal courts have permitted
reversal where an arbitrator "manifest[s] an infidelity" to her obligation to interpret the contract, ...

ignores a plain and unambiguous

provision of the contract.... or even strongly relies on an unamIn contrast, under
biguous and undisputed mistake of fact ....
Pennsylvania "common law" arbitration, which applies to arbitration
arrangements not explicitly invoking the provisions of the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act ... , an arbitrator's error... is unreviewable
on appeal
even if it "has the effect of varying the terms of the con133
tract."
This discussion of the differences between state and federal arbitration law is not exhaustive. Many more differences-both large and
small-exist, and the differences vary from state to state. This summary of some of the key differences simply indicates the importance
of determining whether state arbitration law or the FAA and accompanying federal common law apply to a given arbitration agreement.

129. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 598-600 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Reconstruction
F'm. Corp. v. Harrisons & Crosfield, Ltd., 204 F.2d 366, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 854 (1953); MURRAY ET AL., supra note 101, at 500-01.

130. See WIMNER, supra note 9, § 19:06.
131. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 7502(b) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1993); SCM
Corp. v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 358 N.E.2d 1024 (N.Y. 1976); MURRAY Er Al., supra note
101, at 500-01. For a review of cases addressing the application of statutes of limitation to
arbitration, see Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Statute of Limitations as Bar to Arbitration Under
Agreement, 94 A.L.R.3d 533 (1979).
132. See Caudill v. Board of Educ., 364 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (App. Div. 1975).
133. Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960);
Runewicz v. Keystone Ins. Co., 383 A.2d 189, 191 (Pa. 1978)) (citations omitted).
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THE FAA'S "INVOLVING COMMERCE" REQUIREMENT

Given the immense differences between federal and state arbitra-

tion law, the determination of which law governs the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement can be critical. The choice between federal
and state law can have substantial-even determinative-impact on
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement or award, and even on
the outcome of a case.
As discussed above, the terms of the FAA itself now govern this
choice of law.M For most commercial arbitration agreements, the
choice hinges on the FAA's commerce requirement.135 If an arbitration agreement concerns a transaction involving interstate commerce,
then the FAA and accompanying federal common law control; if the
contract does not involve interstate commerce, then state law controls' 3

134. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
135. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The FAA applies to written arbitration agreements "in any
maritime transaction or.. . a transaction involving commerce" but the Act's application to
maritime transactions is less problematic than its application to commercial transactions. Id.
The FAA provides a more detailed definition of "maritime transactions." It states, "'Maritime
transactions,' as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of water carriers,
agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs of vessels, collisions, or
any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be embraced with admiralty jurisdiction .... " Id. § 1 (compare the Act's definition of "commerce," infra note 136).
In addition, the federal courts have greater authority over admiralty and maritime
matters than they do over general commercial disputes. The Supreme Court has long construed the "provision of Article III, section 2 of the Constitution extending the judicial power

to 'all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction' . . . to vest the federal courts with
authority to create substantive law." MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE A.LOCATION OF JUDICIAL PowER 138 (2d ed. 1990). Federal district courts also have

exclusive original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). In
light of the states' reduced authority to articulate substantive law in these areas, conflicts
between the FAA and state statutes and policies would seem less important.
136. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984);
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The Act
defines "commerce" as:
Commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of
the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory
and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation ....
9 U.S.C. § 1.
Section 1 of the FAA excludes certain contracts from the Act's coverage, but this
exclusion has been interpreted to apply to relatively few cases. It provides that the FAA shall
not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. The courts have construed that
exclusion very narrowly. They typically hold that only employees involved in the actual
movement of goods in interstate commerce are covered by the exclusion. See Erving v.
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Applying the FAA's commerce requirement is a matter of congressional intent. Congress has the constitutional power to regulate
any activity or transaction that "affects interstate commerce."1 37 Applying this standard, the Supreme Court has held that even "intrastate
activities of a very small scale could be federally regulated if they
might affect commerce when combined with similar small-scale activities."' Consequently, Congress has the power to regulate and make
enforceable any arbitration agreement that affects interstate commerce. 139 Given the courts' broad interpretation of "affecting" interstate commerce, Congress likely has the power to regulate and make
enforceable all commercial arbitration agreements and perhaps all
arbitration agreements of any kind.
In determining the scope of the FAA's applicability, therefore,
the question is how much of its constitutional power Congress sought
to exercise when it enacted the FAA. When Congress passes legislation intended to reach everything within its constitutional commerce
power, the legislation usually states expressly that it covers all subject
activities or transactions that "affect" interstate commerce.140 Yet
Congress did not use that language in the FAA. The FAA applies to
all transactions that "involve" commerce.'4 1 In applying the FAA,
therefore, courts must decide whether Congress intended the FAA to
regulate all arbitration agreements within its commerce power (which
likely includes all commercial arbitration agreements) or just some
portion of those agreements. If it sought to regulate less than all
agreements within its commerce power, then the courts must further
decide how to determine what part.
Despite the importance of determining when a transaction is one
"involving commerce" for purposes of the FAA, surprisingly little

Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont,
443 F.2d 783, 785 (Ist Cir. 1971); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment
Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's
Failure of Statutory Vision, 2 J. DISP. REsOL 259, 263-70 (1991) (criticizing the courts'
interpretation of the exclusion in § 1 as being unduly narrow).
137. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77
(1981); see also JOHN E. NOWACK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 153-54 (3d ed. 1986).
138. NOWAK Er AL., supra note 137, at 153 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942)).
139. See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984).
140. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988); National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 160(a) (1988).
141. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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attention has been given to the issue. Although the Supreme Court
has addressed the issue, it has done so on a case-by-ease basis. The
Court has offered little in the way of a test or standard to be applied
in other cases.142 Lower federal courts and state courts have confronted the issue many times, but they use a variety of approaches
and standards. They typically make a narrow, fact-based determination
of the commerce issue without delineating the standard used.'4 3 The
courts sometimes do not even consider the issue, applying federal or
state law with little consideration of the possible applicability of the
other.1" Perhaps more surprising, commentators have all but ignored
the issue.'45 This part of this Article, therefore, collects and analyzes the cases-state and federal-that address the FAA's interstate
commerce requirement.
A.

Supreme Court Cases

The Supreme Court's treatment of the FAA's interstate commerce
issue is sparse. The issue has never been the central issue before the
Court. Rather, the Court has addressed the Act's commerce requirement in passing to reach"4 or to avoid"4 other issues concerning
the FAA. Indeed, the Court has addressed the commerce issue directly
only twice. 4 ' In each instance, the Court made a relatively narrow
fact-based determination that the transaction in question did or did not
involve interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court's first case to directly address the interstate
commerce issue was Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America."9

142. See infra part III.A.; see also Speidel, supra note 8, at 170.
143. See infra part III.C.
144. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 734 F. Supp. 192 (D.NJ. 1990)
(applying the FAA to a construction contract without considering the possible application of
state law); Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 552 A.2d 1207 (Conn. 1989) (deciding whether
arbitrator could award attorney fees in lemon law case); Bill Butler Assoc. v. New England
Sav. Bank, 611 A.2d 463 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that claims under the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act are not arbitrable, without mentioning the FAA); A.C. Beals Co.
v. Rhode Island Hosp., 292 A.2d 865 (RI. 1972) (applying state law to an arbitration arising
from a contract under which a seller manufactured boilers in Massachusetts and delivered
them to a buyer in Rhode Island).
145. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
146. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (discussed infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text); see also cases cited infra note 162.
147. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (discussed
infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text).
148. Search of WESTLAW, SCT and SCT-OLD files (August 13, 1992).
149. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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That case arose from an employment contract under which Polygraphic, a New York corporation, employed Bernhardt as the superintendent of its plant in Vermont."5 The parties entered the contract in
New York while Bernhardt was a New York resident. Some time
after Bernhardt moved to Vermont to perform his duties under the
contract, Polygraphic discharged him. Bernhardt then filed an action
in a Vermont state court alleging that Polygraphic breached the employment contract. Polygraphic removed the case to federal district
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship and sought to stay the
action pending arbitration. The district court held the FAA applicable
and the court of appeals held it inapplicable, both on the basis of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
The Supreme Court avoided the difficult Erie issue by deciding
that the FAA did not apply because the contract involved neither a
maritime transaction nor interstate commerce. The totality of the
Court's brief treatment of the determinative commerce issue is as
follows:
No maritime transaction is involved here. Nor does this contract
evidence "a transaction involving commerce" within the meaning of
§ 2 of the Act. There is no showing that petitioner while performing his duties under the employment contract was working "in"
commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in
activity 2 that affected commerce, within the meaning of our decisions.11

The Court ignored the fact that the contract clearly contemplated
Bernhardt's moving from New York to Vermont to perform his duties
under the contract.
The Court's only other real discussion of the FAA's interstate
commerce requirement was in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co."' That case arose from a contract under which
Prima Paint purchased Flood & Conklin's ("F&C") paint business. In
connection with the purchase, the parties entered a consulting agreement under which F&C agreed to advise and assist Prima Paint in
servicing customer accounts, and moving manufacturing operations

150. Bemhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956).
151. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
152. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01.
153. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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from New Jersey to Maryland." The consulting agreement contained an arbitration clause, which Prima Paint alleged to be unenforceable.
The Supreme Court held that the consulting agreement involved
interstate commerce under the FAA. Perhaps because a contract for
assistance in moving the operations of a multistate business from one
state to another involves interstate commerce under any but the most
restrictive definition, the Court again offered little discussion of the
issue.'55 In addition to rejecting the dissent's argument that the
FAA applies only to "contracts between merchants for the interstate
shipment of goods, " " the Court simply stated:
Prima Paint acquired a New Jersey paint business serving at least
175 wholesale clients in a number of States, and secured F&C's
assistance in arranging the transfer of manufacturing and selling
operations from New Jersey to Maryland. The consulting agreement
was inextricably tied to this interstate transfer and to the continuing
operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling business.
There could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce.'5
The Court's brief statements in Prima Paint and Bernhardt provide little direction for future cases. The Court held in Prima Paint
that the FAA's application is not limited to contracts between merchants for the physical interstate shipment of goods, but otherwise the
Court's ruling was a purely fact-specific finding that the contract in
that case involved interstate commerce. The Court's statement in
Bernhardt indicated in dicta that the commerce requirement would
have been satisfied if the defendant had proven that Bernhardt "was
working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was
engaging in activity that affected commerce."' 8 Although the
Court's statement indicates a fairly broad interpretation of interstate
commerce, the Court apparently was not ready to give the commerce
issue the same broad interpretation and perfunctory treatment it re-

154. Id at 397, 401.
155. The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit briefly discussed the existence of
interstate commerce, but neither said that the parties contested the issue. The district court did
not mention the interstate commerce issue. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
262 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
156. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, 388 U.S. 395, 401 n.7 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting) (quoting ia at 409).
157. Id at 401 (citations omitted).
158. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01 (quoted supra text accompanying note 152).
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ceives in other contexts.

59

Reluctant to permit the inference of in-

terstate activity from the contract itself, the Court apparently required
proof of interstate commerce." 6 The contract, after all, contemplated
that Bernhardt would move from New York to Vermont to perform
his duties under the contract, and he did so. His employer, Polygraph161
ic, was a New York corporation and operated a plant in Vermont.
Despite their lack of guidance, these two brief statements are the
Supreme Court's most in-depth treatments of the commerce issue. In
its numerous other FAA cases, the Court (and presumably the parties)
simply assumed the applicability of the FAA, perhaps because the
involvement of interstate commerce was irrefutable. 62 The Court's
other cases that mention the issue contain scarcely more than one
sentence on the subject. 63 The Supreme Court thus has not deter-

159. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of other legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress' commerce power, see NOWAK Er AL., supra note 137, §§ 4.9, 4.10.
Chief Justice Earl Warren later stated that the issue was still open whether a construction contract between a New York general contractor and a Georgia subcontractor for work
on a Georgia construction project requiring interstate movement of materials and personnel
involved commerce for purposes of the FAA. See Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities,
Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 173 (1963) (Warren, I., concurring); see also Electronic & Missile
Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 306 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1962).
160. Accord Higley South, Inc. v. Park Shore Dev. Co., 494 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. CL
App. 1986) (pleading and proof of interstate commerce involvement is required for application
of the FAA; common knowledge, surmise, and allegations are insufficient). For a discussion
of evidentiary requirements on the commerce issue, see infra notes 210-31 and accompanying
text.
161. Bemhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956).
162. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (involving parties who did not dispute that the construction
contract at issue involved interstate commerce); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 225-27, 238, 242 (1987) (applying the FAA to the customer agreement between the customer and the securities brokerage firm); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1983) (holding that the FAA applied to a contract
between a North Carolina hospital and an Alabama contractor for construction of a hospital
in North Carolina); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511-15 (1974) (holding that
an American company's purchase of European business entities pursuant to a contract negotiated in both Europe and the United States constituted "commerce with foreign nations," thus
the FAA applied).
163. In Volt Info. Sciences, the Court simply noted that "[i]t is undisputed that this
contract falls within the coverage of the FAA, since it involves interstate commerce." 489
U.S. at 476. The Court mentioned the commerce issue in Moses H. Cone in a footnote, but
only to summarize the North Carolina courts' changing treatment of the issue. Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 27 n.36. In Scherk, the Court summarily stated that the FAA clearly
applied because "the transaction in this case constitutes 'commerce with foreign nations.'" 417
U.S. at 511 nL5.
In a concurrence in Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167
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mined whether the FAA's commerce requirement includes all transac-

tions within the reach of Congress's commerce power, nor has it
articulated a definitive test or standard to be applied in determining
whether a transaction involves commerce for purposes of the FAA.
The Court's only definitive ruling on the issue is that application of
the FAA is not limited to164"contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods."
B.

Standardsfor Determining Involvement
in Interstate Commerce

In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the issue,
lower federal courts and state courts have addressed the FAA's interstate commerce requirement in different ways. Like the Supreme
Court, these courts often make a fact-based ruling on the issue without providing any discemable standard.'65 Several federal courts of
appeal and state courts, however, have sought to articulate generally
applicable standards for determining whether a transaction involves
interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA. This section summarizes these standards.
1. An Expansive Interpretation of the FAA:
Does the Contract Affect Interstate Commerce?
Several courts have interpreted the FAA's commerce language
broadly "to be coextensive with congressional power to regulate under
the Commerce Clause." 166 Those courts thus apply the FAA to all
transactions that "affect" interstate commerce.67 Since this standard

(1963), Chief Justice Warren pointed out that the Court's decision left open the issue of
whether "a construction project, like the one in this case, [is] one 'involving commerce'
within the restricted scope of the Arbitration AcL" Id at 173 (Warren, J.,concurring). The
contract disputed in Moseley was one between a New York general contractor and a Georgia
subcontractor for heating and plumbing work on a missile site construction project in Georgia, and the project "required substantial interstate movement of materials and personnel."
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v. Moseley, 306 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 374 U.S. 167 (1963). On those facts, the Fifth Circuit held that the contract
involved interstate commerce. Id For additional discussion of the interstate commerce requirement in the context of construction contracts, see infra notes 244-58 and accompanying text.
164. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 n.7 (1967).
165. See authorities cited and discussed infra part lU.C.
166. Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986).
167. See, e.g., Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1037 (1984) ("Under the commerce clause, Congress may reach activities 'affecting' interstate
commerce."); Kodak Mining Co. v. Cans Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Ky. 1984)
(relying on Federal Mine Safety and Health Act cases to hold that all mining activity is
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goes to the limits of Congress' constitutional power, it obviously is
the broadest standard applied to the FAA interstate commerce requirement.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Snyder v. Smith"' contains
perhaps the most extensive and most often cited discussion justifying
use of the "affecting interstate commerce" standard in FAA cases.
The court first ruled that the FAA "does not limit a court to considering only those transactions expressly authorized on the face of the
contract in determining whether the FAA applies."" ° The Seventh
Circuit noted that in Prima Paint the Supreme Court relied on affidavits and related contracts to determine that the transaction involved
commerce.17 The Seventh Circuit went on to conclude that prior
Supreme Court decisions and the "strong federal policy favoring arbitration" demand that the FAA's commerce requirement "be construed
broadly.""' It particularly focused on Southland Corp. v.
Keating,'2 in which the Supreme Court held that the FAA's commerce language demonstrated Congress' reliance on its commerce
power in enacting the FAA."3 Since the commerce language was an
invocation of Congress' commerce powers, the Seventh Circuit said,
"Congress intended the FAA to apply to all contracts that it constitutionally could regulate." 7 4 The Seventh Circuit then pulled back

interstate commerce). Without discussing the test or its significance, several more courts have
used the phrase "affecting interstate commerce" while applying the FAA. See Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Since the arbitration clause
under consideration was part of a contract which affected interstate commerce... the
[FAA] ...
govem[s] our analysis."); Hoffelder v. Zinzow, No. 90 C 5450, 1991 WL
104178, at -2-3 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1991); Cohen v. Cowen Sec., Inc., No. 89-8090-Civ.Paine, 1989 WL 222963, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 1989); Seltzer v. Klein, No. Civ. A. 886737, 1989 WL 41288, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1989); Lafayette Coal Co. v. Gilman Paper
Co., 640 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. 111.1986); Fairchild & Co., Inc. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg
& Potomac R.R. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1311-12 (D.D.C. 1981); GAP Corp. v. Werner, 484
N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (App. Div.), rev'd, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083
(1986) ("Even though GAP moved to stay arbitration under New York law ....
the instant
arbitration is governed by the [FAA] . . . since the employment agreement affects interstate
commerce."); Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera Indus. Y Commercial v. International
Standard Elec. Corp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (-The [FAA] and federal
law govern where the contractual activity facilitates, affects, or arises out of interstate or
foreign commerce.").
168. 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.)1 cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
169. Id. at 417.
170. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 & n.6 (1967).
171. Snyder, 736 F.2d at 417.
172. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
173. For a discussion of Southland, see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
174. Snyder, 736 F.2d at 418. The Seventh Circuit's reasoning makes a jump to reach
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from making such a holding, however, noting that the transaction
before it involved commerce
without such a broad interpretation of
175
the FAA's applicability.
2. A Subjective Standard: Did the Parties Contemplate
Substantial Interstate Activity?
A number of courts have concluded that Congress did not intend
for the FAA to extend to all transactions Congress could constitutionally regulate.' 76 Consequently, those courts conclude, the standard
for applying the FAA "is not the 'regulating standard' of 'affecting
interstate commerce.'"'" If the FAA does not exercise the full
reach of Congress' commerce power and does not apply to all transactions affecting commerce, of course, courts must decide how far it
reaches; they must develop a standard for determining which contracts
and transactions fall within its control.
Many courts follow the thoughtful concurring opinion of Judge
Lumbard in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction
Co.178 That case arose from a construction dispute. A Connecticut
corporation and a New Jersey corporation entered a joint venture in
order to obtain a contract to construct a housing project at a United
States Air Force Base in Florida. 79 The joint venture entered a subcontract with Metro Industrial Painting, a New York corporation, to
perform painting work at the Florida construction site. The subcontract contained an arbitration provision. When a dispute arose concerning Metro Industrial's performance and its right to receive alleged
delay damages, Metro Industrial sought to have the dispute arbitrated.180
The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration, and the
joint venture appealed, arguing among other things that the FAA did

this conclusion. Just because Congress relied on its commerce power to enact the FAA, it

does not necessarily follow that Congress intended for the Act to apply to all contracts it
could constitutionally reach with that power.
175. See id.
176. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 385-88 (2d
Cir.) (Lumbard, ., concurring), cert denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Ex parte Warren, 548 So.
2d 157, 160 (ALa.), cer. denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989); Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ.
v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 n.1 (N.C. App. 1981).
177. Warren, 548 So. 2d at 160.
178. 287 F.2d 382, 385-88 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, J., concurring), cert denied, 368 U.S. 817
(1961).
179. Id at 383.
180. Id at 384.
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not apply because the transaction did not involve interstate commerce.
The Second Circuit affirmed. It found that the transaction involved
interstate commerce regardless of what standard applied, because of
the transaction's many interstate elements."' 1
Judge Lumbard concurred in the court's decision but wrote a
separate opinion to address "the significant question as to the scope
of federal law and its effect on state courts." 1" Under the Second
83
Circuit's earlier conclusion (later adopted by the Supreme Court)
that the FAA was an exercise of Congress's commerce power,1 he
noted that the FAA is applicable in state courts as well as federal
s
courts.85
He also noted the Second Circuit's ruling (later adopted

by the Supreme Court)1 that the FAA "empowered the courts to
develop a substantive body of federal law with regard to the interpretation and construction of [arbitration] clauses.""8 7 These rulings had
the combined impact, he suggested, of displacing a substantial body
of state contract and arbitration law. 88 "It is most important, therefore," Judge Lumbard said, "to define precisely what the limits of the
federal law are."" 9 In the context of this case, he continued, the
issue is "whether... the contract to paint buildings in Florida was
one 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce." "'g
To address this issue, Judge Lumbard considered Congress' purpose in enacting the FAA, the extent to which Congress intended the
FAA to reach, and the extent to which Congress intended to supersede state law. He found that:

181. Id, The court noted that:
Criwenty per cent of Metro's work force at 'the Florida site, as well as a substantial number of supervisory personnel, were transported from New York City to
Florida; and materials used by Metro's employees were purchased from other
states, as were materials used by other subcontractors, many of whom were also
from out of state.

Id.
182. Id at 385 (Lumbard, L,concurring).
183. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984), discussed supra notes 63-70
and accompanying text.
184. Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at. 385-86 (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364

U.S. 801 (1960)).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 386 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 386.
See id.
Id
Id.
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[Tihe legislative history of the [FAA] reveals little awareness on the
part of Congress that state law might be affected. 91 Having no
clear mandate from Congress as to the extent to which state statutes
and decisions are to be superseded, we must be cautious in construing the act lest we excessively encroach on the powers which Congressional policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the
states...

192

In enacting the [FAA], unlike various other statutes invoking
the interstate commerce power, Congress was not seeking to regulate and control activity affecting commerce, but was providing for
those engaged in interstate transactions an expeditious extra-judicial
process for settling disputes. The [FAA] may be avoided entirely by
those engaged in interstate traffic if they merely refrain from including any arbitration provisions in their contracts. The Congressional
intent was not, therefore, to impose an adjudicative system on those
who wished none nor was the intent to affect all contracts possessing certain interstate elements; the purpose of the act was to assure
those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by
federal judges, or, since the clarification in Lawrence, 93 by state
courts or legislatures.
The significant question, therefore, is not whether, in carrying
out the terms of the contract, the parties did cross state lines, but
whether, at the time they entered into it and accepted the arbitration
clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity. Cogent evidence regarding their state of mind at the time would be the terms
of the contract, and if it, on its face, evidences interstate traffic,.., the contract should come within section 2 [of the FAA]. In
addition, evidence as to how the parties expected the contract to be
performed and how it was performed is relevant to whether substantial interstate activity was contemplated.' 9"

191. For a study of the FAA's legislative history that supports this conclusion, see
Atwood, supra note 8.
192. For support, Judge Lumbard cites Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the
United States Arbitration Act: A Ferrago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to Remedy, 69
YALE LJ. 847, 863 (1960).
193. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959)
(holding that the FAA was an exercise of Congress's commerce power and, consequently, is
applicable in state courts as well as federal courts), cert granted, 362 U.S. 909, and cert.
dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960)).
194. Metro Indus., 287"F.2d at 386-87 (citations omitted) (footnotes added).
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Judge Lumbard further noted:
The fact that it is necessary for one party to cross state lines
in order to fulfill obligations arising out of the contract should not
by itself bring the arbitration clause within the reach of the federal
statute. The [FAA] should apply only when the parties know or
have reason to believe that the performance of the contract will
require substantial interstate movement."
Applying this new standard to the case before him, Judge Lumbard
found it "reasonably
clear that the parties anticipated substantial inter1
state traffic." 9
A number of courts use Judge Lumbard's test. The supreme
courts of North Carolina1" and Alabama 198 expressly adopted
Judge Lumbard's standard and routinely apply it in FAA cases. Several other courts quote Judge Lumbard's opinion at length and expressly follow his analysis." 9 Still other courts use the language of
Judge Lumbard's "contemplating" commerce standard.' °

195. Id at 388 (citations omitted).
196. Id.
197. See Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group Leasing Co., 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C.
App. 1984); Cohoon v. Ziman, 298 S.E.2d 729, 730-31 (N.C. App. 1983); Burke County
Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (N.C. App. 1981).
198. See Ex parte Clements, 587 So. 2d 317, 319 (Ala. 1991); Ex pare Warren, 548 So.
2d 157, 159-60 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989). In three cases decided in 1992,
however, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted its own "slightest nexus with interstate commercd" standard. See infira note 205.
199. See Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 579, 585-87
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aft'd, 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975); Monte v. Southern Delaware County
Auth. 212 F. Supp. 604, 609-11 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 321 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1963); Action
CATV, Inc. v. Wildwood Partners, Ltd., 508 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1987);
Riverfront Properties Ltd. v. Max Factor 111, 460 So. 2d 948, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127, 130 (Kan. CL App.
1982).
200. See Varley v. Tarrytown Assoc., Inc., 477 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying
the FAA because the contract "contemplated that Varley would act as a textile consultant
throughout the United States and preliminary discussions evidenced the clear expectation that
Varley would evaluate plants and fabrics manufactured throughout the country"); Singer Co.
v. Tappan Co., 403 F. Supp. 322, 323 n.1 (D.NJ. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1976);
O'Meara v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 230 F. Supp. 788, 790-91 (N.D. Ill.
1964);
University Casework Sys., Inc. v. Bahre, 362 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind. CL App. 1977) (examining "both the position of the parties at the time the contract was executed and their conduct
subsequent to the contracts formation in determining whether the parties to the contract
therein contemplated a transaction which would involve interstate commerce"); Pathman
Constr. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844, 852 (Ind. CL App. 1975); Deep
South Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328 S.W.2d 897, 905-06 ('ex. Civ. App. 1959) (holding
that the FAA is inapplicable to a contract for the sale of natural gas because the parties at
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As one might expect, courts applying Judge Lumbard's test are
less likely to find involvement in interstate commerce than courts
applying the "affecting" commerce standard. This author has found no
cases applying the "affecting" commerce standard that have found a
contract not to involve interstate commerce. Several cases exist,
meanwhile, in which courts applied Judge Lumbard's standard and
found the contract not to involve interstate commerce.2"'
3. Other Standards and Factors
The broad "affecting" commerce standard and Judge Lumbard's
subjective standard are the only tests widely quoted or used repeatedly. Several cases, however, address the FAA's commerce requirement in such a way that one can discern a standard, or at least par-

the time they entered the contract did not contemplate that the gas would be resold in
interstate commerce).
Some courts, while conceding that the parties' expectations are relevant to deciding
whether a contract involves interstate commerce, hold that their actual performance must be
considered as well. See C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships,
375 F. Supp. 446, 450 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (stating that the "subjective intent of the parties is
not controlling in determining if the agreement objectively evidences a transaction involving
commerce, but it is illuminating as to how the parties interpreted their own contract");
University Casework Sys., 362 N.E.2d 155.
201. See Clements, 587 So. 2d at 319; Warren, 548 So. 2d at 159-60; Action CATV, 508
So. 2d at 1276 (stating that even though the plaintiff managed a Florida cable system from
Massachusetts, the FAA did not apply to a contract for the construction and management of
the system because the original patties to the contract did not contemplate interstate activity);
Riverfront Properties, 460 So. 2d at 953-54; Paramore, 316 S.E.2d at 92 (in which the
parties did not contemplate substantial interstate activity in, and the FAA did not apply to, a
contract for the lease of a tractor already present at the defendant's North Carolina dealership,
even though lease payments were to be made to Montana).
In the following cases, courts applied Judge Lumbard's standard and found that the
contract did involve interstate commerce: O'Meara, 230 F. Supp. at 790-91 (holding that the
FAA applied to the contract for sale of natural gas where the buyer operated an interstate
pipeline system and the seller obtained federal regulatory permission to sell natural gas for
resale in interstate commerce); R. Palmer Constr. Co., 642 P.2d at 130 (holding that the
FAA applied to construction contract because parties contemplated the use of redwood siding
which had to be shipped from outside Kansas, and the parties knew the building would be
used to house and sell musical instruments that moved in interstate commerce); Burke County
Pub. Schm Bd of Ed, 279 S.E.2d at 822-23 (applying the FAA to a contract for architectural services relating to the construction of a school in North Carolina, because the principal
architect worked and resided in Indiana, most of the architectural work was done in Indiana,
the architect made periodic visits to the construction site in North Carolina, the structural
engineering design work was done by a firm in Michigan, and the architect dealt with and
specified materials manufactured by suppliers all over the country); Cohoon, 298 S.E.2d at
730-31 (where the parties contemplated substantial interstate activity in, and FAA applied to,
a partnership agreement between citizens of both North and South Carolina relating to land
development in both states).
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ticular factors that the court found determinative.
As noted above, the Alabama Supreme Court at various times
has used a standard under which it applies the FAA if the arbitration
agreement has "the slightest nexus" with interstate commerce.2" The
court articulated this test in Ex parte Costa & Head (Atrium),
Ltd,20 3 decided in 1986. The court then apparently abandoned the
test for six years, choosing instead to apply Judge Lumbard's
test.2" The Alabama court has now revived its "slightest nexus"
test, having applied it in its last three cases on the issue. 5
The effect of Alabama's "slightest nexus" standard is uncertain,
but it is probably narrower than the "affecting commerce" standard,
and broader than Judge Lumbard's test that the Alabama courts applied earlier. Of the four cases in which the court applied the test, the
court found that three of the contracts in question involved interstate
commerce. Each of those three cases concerned a construction contract which required the use of materials shipped, or personnel, from
other states.2" In the fourth case, however, the court found that a
lease of surface mining rights did not involve interstate commerce
even though it involved residents of different states and required lease
payments to be mailed across state lines.2"
In Downing v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2O8 the Michigan Court of
Appeals seemed to use a less expansive interpretation of "involving
commerce," but one that still focuses on objective events of the transaction. Specifically, the court looked at the location of events relevant
to the transaction to determine if they occurred in more than one
state. The court held that the contract in this case, an automobile
insurance policy issued by a national insurance company, did not

202. See Warren, 548 So. 2d at 162 (Maddox, J., dissenting); Ex pane Costa & Head
(Atrium), Ltd., 486 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1986). The Alabama court has since rejected
this approach and embraced Judge Lumbard's approach of determining whether the parties
.contemplated substantial interstate activity." See supra notes 175-98 and accompanying text.
203. 486 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Ala. 1986).
204. See Clements, 587 So. 2d at 319; Warren, 548 So. 2d at 159-60. The "slightest
nexus" standard was used during this time in at least one dissenting opinion. See id. at 162

(Mddox, J., dissenting).
205. See Ex parte Brice Bldg. Co., Inc., 607 So. 2d 132, 133-34 (Ala. 1992); AJ. Taft
Coal Co. v. Randolph, 602 So. 2d 395, 397 (Ala. 1992); Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca, 598 So. 2d
1376, 1379 (Ala. 1992).
206. See Ex parte Brice Bldg., 607 So. 2d at 133; Maxus, 598 So. 2d at 1379; Costa &
Head, 486 So. 2d at 1275.
207. See AJ. Taft Coal Co., 602 So. 2d at 397.
208. 335 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. App. 1983), appeal denied and vacated in part, 355
N.W.2d 111 (Mich. 1984).
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evidence a transaction involving interstate commerce. "Every event
relevant to this case," the court found, "took place in Michigan.
Thus,... the federal act does not apply to plaintiff's contract."2 '
This contract likely would be deemed to involve interstate commerce
under either the "affecting commerce" standard or Judge Lumbard's
subjective standard, because the insurance policy likely covered the
insured and his car not only in Michigan but in any state to which
they travelled.
4. Burdens of Proof
Whether a transaction is one that involves interstate commerce is
a question of fact.210 Whatever test courts apply in determining
whether a transaction involves commerce, they must decide who has
the burden of raising and proving the issue. Can a party rely on mere
allegations of interstate commerce if the party opposing application of
the FAA presents no evidence on the issue, or must a party always
present evidence of interstate commerce to invoke the Act? If the
parties present conflicting evidence regarding the interstate and intrastate nature of the transaction, who has the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue? Although the handful of reported cases that address
these issues do not provide definitive answers, close analysis of the
opinions indicate some consensus on the burden of proof issues.
In Maxum Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp.," the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rendered the most decisive opinion on
the issue. The court stated:
[The plaintiff] essentially argues that in order for the Federal
Arbitration Act to apply, the party invoking the Act must put forth
specific evidence documenting the interstate aspect of the transaction. The statute does not impose such a burden, however. The
Federal Act applies to arbitration agreements in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce," but does not
require proof by affidavit or other specific evidence of the nexus to
interstate commerce. Where, as here, the party seeking arbitration
alleges that the transaction is within the scope of the Act 2 12 and

209. Id. at 141.
210. See FOSTER, supra note 9, § 1.05, at 10; see also Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp.
v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 387 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1967); Else v. Inflight
Cinema IntI, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1239, 1244 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
211. 779 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1985).
212. In its memorandum supporting its motion to stay the action pending arbitration, the
defendant asserted that *both parties to the subcontract are incorporated in different jurisdic-
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the party opposing application of the Act does not come forward
with evidence to rebut jurisdiction under the federal statute, we do
not read into the Act a requirement of further proof by the party
invoking the federal law.2" 3

In the Fourth Circuit, therefore, the mere allegation of involvement in
interstate commerce is sufficient unless evidence is presented to rebut
that allegation. The Fourth Circuit clearly puts the burden of going
forward14 with the evidence on the party opposing application of the
2
FAA.
In apparent contrast to Maxum Foundations, several appellate
decisions have refused to apply the FAA because involvement in
interstate commerce was not sufficiently proven.215 Those Cases are
frequently cited for the proposition that a party invoking the FAA
must present evidence of interstate commerce. 2 16 Merritt-Chapman
& Scott Corp. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission is one of
the most frequently cited of these cases. The plaintiff in MerrittChapman filed an action seeking damages. The defendant sought to
stay the action pending arbitration pursuant to a contractual arbitration
provision. The trial court stayed the action and the plaintiff appealed.
The Third Circuit refused to apply the FAA, stating:
The...

allegations of the complaint ...

make no reference to

commerce. Defendant's motion to dismiss... [does not] make any
claim that the contract between the parties constituted a transaction
involving commerce. However much we may speculate on what

may have been the nature of the performance required by the con-

tions and performance involved the transportation of materials and workers in interstate
commerce." Id. at 978 n4.
213. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
214. For a similar approach, see Kirschner v. West Co., 247 F. Supp. 550, 552 (E.D.
Pa.) (where the court takes judicial notice that a transaction in coatings to be used in the
pharmaceutical industry involves commerce under the FAA where that finding is supported by
the pleadings), aft'd, 353 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966).
215. See Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 784 (3d Cir. 1975)
(discussed infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text); Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471
F.2d 1304, 1307 n.2 (1st Cir. 1973) (discussed infra note 225); Merritt-Chapman & Scott
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 387 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1967) (discussed infra
notes 217-23 and accompanying text); Higley S., Inc. v. Park Shore Dev. Co., 494 So. 2d
227, 230 n.1 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986) (discussed infra notes 226-27 and accompanying
text).
216. See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1040 n.36
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); accord FOSTER, supra note 9, § 1.05, at
10.
217. 387 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1967).
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tract, it is impossible for us to determine
on appeal whether the
2 18
United States Arbitration Act applies.
Another leading case that follows Merritt-Chapman is Gavlik
Construction Co. v. H.F. Campbell.219 The district court in Gavlik
stayed the action pending arbitration and the plaintiff appealed. On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the FAA did not apply because the
defendant did not "sustain its burden of establishing that the subcontracts evidence 'a transaction involving commerce."' ° The Third
Circuit ruled as follows:
The district court made no findings as to whether the Gavlik
subcontracts evidence a "transaction involving commerce," the predicate for applying the United States Arbitration Act. Hence, it could
not, and therefore did not, determine the applicability of that statute.
The absence of these findings precludes our consideration of the
applicability of the act. " 1
The court noted that it could remand the case for a finding on the
issue, but decided that remand was unnecessary. It held that the district court had inherent power to stay the action even if the FAA did
not apply.m
Although these and similar opinions seem to put the burden of
proving interstate commerce on the party invoking the FAA, careful
reading of the opinions indicate that they are not contrary to Maxum
Foundations. Despite their strong rhetoric about the importance of
factual proofm they do not really address the burden of proof issue. Rather, they hold that appellate courts cannot apply the FAA on
appeal absent a finding of fact by the trial court or something in the
record indicating that the transaction at issue involved interstate commerce. In Merritt-Chapman, the opinion indicates that there was not
so much as an allegation of interstate commerce at the trial level,

218. Id at 772; see also Bucks County Bar Ass'n v. Data-Matic Sys. Co., No.
CIV.A.85-7017, 1985 WL 5013, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1985) (holding the FAA
inapplicable to a contract to provide computer hardware and software because "there are no
allegations evidencing a transaction involving commerce. Both parties are alleged to be
citizens of Pennsylvania and no reference is made to commerce").
219. 526 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1975).
220. Id at 784.
221. Id.
222. Id
223. See Merritt-Chapman, 387 F.2d at 772 (discussed supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text); Emlenton Area Mun. Auth. v. Miles, 548 A.2d 623, 625 n.2 (Pa. Super. CL
1988), appeal denied, 563 A.2d 498 (Pa. 1989).
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much less evidence of interstate commerce. The court's reference to
allegations in the pleadings suggests that unrebutted allegations might

be sufficient to justify application of the FAA. In Gavlik, it is not
clear whether anyone alleged interstate commerce;
again, therefore, the court might have applied the FAA if confronted with
unrebutted allegations of interstate commerce. These cases thus stand

for the proposition that the party invoking the FAA has the burden of
pleading interstate commerce, but they do not necessarily address the

burden of production of evidence or the burden of persuasion.'
Even Higley South, Inc. v. Park Shore Development Co.,, 6 the
opinion with perhaps the strongest rhetoric about the need for proof,

appears to follow this assessment. Rather than a dispute over
arbitrability, Higley South arose from a declaratory judgment action in
which Higley South sought a judgment that several arbitrable disputes
involving several parties should be consolidated into one arbitration

proceeding. In order to rule on the consolidation issue, the court had
to determine whether Florida law or the FAA applied. The Florida
Court of Appeals ruled that it could not apply the FAA to the case.
The court stated:
[Tihere is nothing before us permitting the finding that interstate
commerce is either affected or involved. We... reject the notion
that we should find such commerce contact from the nature and
magnitude of the construction undertaken by [the plaintiff]. Common

knowledge or surmise cannot substitute for proof or, as in this case,
a pleading alleging the presence of interstate commerce.'

224. See Gavlik Constr. Co., 526 F.2d at 784.
225. See also Warren Bros. Co. v. Cardi Corp., 471 F.2d 1304, 1307 n.2 (1st Cir. 1973)
(refusing to apply the FAA on appeal, but again indicating that the parties failed even to
allege interstate commerce: "Since no reference to interstate commerce is made in any of the
papers before the court, we must assume that the federal act is inapplicable"); Higley S., Inc.
v. Park Shore Dev. Co., 494 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986) (discussed infra at notes
226-29 and accompanying text).
226. 494 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986).
227. Id at 230 n.1; see also Caudill v. Board of Educ., 364 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. Div.
1975), in which the court held[JFrom this record it cannot be determined whether the contract was one "evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce," and accordingly, whether federal
or state law is applicable. The matter must therefore be remanded to determine
whether the plans themselves were items in interstate commerce and if not, to
further develop the facts with relation to the extent of materials orderect in interstate commerce and whether those materials were necessarily procured outside the
state pursuant to the architects, plans.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
This decision is also less than definitive on the burden of production issue, because it
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Although the court in this passage emphasizes the importance of
factual evidence, the decision does not necessarily put the burden of
production on the party invoking the FAA. The last phrase in the
quotation suggests that an unrebutted allegation of interstate commerce might suffice.
Taken together, these cases clearly indicate that the party invoking the FAA has the burden of pleading interstate commerce. 22 Except for Maxum Foundations, however, none of the cases provide any
real authority on burdens of production and persuasion at the trial
level. Indeed, close reading of the opinions indicates that these courts
might agree with the Maxum Foundations holding that once the party
invoking the FAA alleges interstate commerce, the burden of contradicting that allegation shifts to the party opposing application of the
FAA to present evidence or at least arguments that the transaction
does not involve interstate commerce. None of the cases address the
ultimate burden of persuasion once the issue of interstate commerce is
joined. Some cases suggest the necessity of trial court findings concerning interstate commerce to support application of the FAA on
appeal, 29 but other courts have expressly rejected even that requirement.' The prudent course for the party seeking application of the

is not clear from the opinion whether the interstate commerce issue was even alleged or
considered in the trial court. Conceivably, the court may have followed the course of Maxum
Foundations, Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussed supra
notes 211-16 and accompanying text), and applied the FAA if the party seeking arbitration
had only alleged interstate commerce.
228. But cf cases cited infra note 230. These cases stand for the proposition that appellate courts can apply the FAA despite the absence of trial court findings on the issue of
interstate commerce when the involvement of interstate commerce is "obvious." Presumably,
therefore, a trial dourt could apply the FAA despite the absence of allegations of interstate
commerce when the involvement of interstate commerce is obvious from the contract itself.
229. See Gavlik Constr. Co., 526 F.2d at 784; Emlenton Area Mun. Auth. v. Miles, 548
A.2d 623, 625 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (refusing to apply the FAA because the trial court
was silent regarding interstate commerce even though a party submitted a proposed finding of
fact on the issue; noting also that remand for a ruling on the issue would be appropriate
except that the result is the same under state law).
230. See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 551 F.2d 1026, 1040 n.36
(5th Cir. 1977) (applying the FAA even though the trial court made no "explicit finding"
concerning interstate commerce, because the contract at issue "obviously is a transaction
involving commerce"), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); Missouri ex rel. St. Joseph Light
& Power Co. v. Donelson, 631 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. CL App. 1982) (applying the FAA
even though the trial court made no factual determination concerning interstate commerce
because "it is plain enough from the record ...and from the briefs and oral arguments ...
that the contract involved interstate commerce"); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Marathon
Oil Co., 794 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1986) (per cuiam) (holding that explicit findings
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FAA, of course, is to allege interstate commerce, introduce evidence
to support the allegation, and secure a factual determination by the
231
trial court that the transaction involved interstate commerce.

C. Applicability of the FAA to ParticularTypes of Contracts
As noted above, most cases do not apply a generally applicable
test or standard in determining whether a contract or transaction "involves" commerce for purposes of the FAA. Rather, most courts
simply review the interstate elements of each transaction and conclude
that it does or does not involve interstate commerce. These courts
frequently rely on previous cases that concern similar contracts or
facts. This section of the Article thus reviews the courts' rulings on
the FAA's commerce requirement in several frequently encountered
categories of contracts.
1. Contracts for the Sale or Lease of Goods
The contracts that most clearly fall within the FAA's commerce
requirement are contracts for the interstate sale of goods. Application
of the FAA to even these contracts, however, must be analyzed to
determine just what interstate elements must exist for the transaction
to be deemed one "involving" interstate commerce.
The transactions that most clearly involve interstate commerce
are sales contracts between residents of different states, requiring the
physical movement of goods from one state to another. 2 These
regarding interstate commerce are not required for application of the FAA on appeal, because
the district court specifically found that "federal law governed the arbitrability of the dispute.
Inherent in such a finding is that the contract [involved] interstate commerce").
231. See FOSTER, supra note 9, § 1.05, at 10-11.
232. See Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying the
FAA to a contract under which an American manufacturer agreed to buy textiles from a
Japanese manufacturer); Municipal Energy Agency of Miss. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 804
F.2d 338, 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the FAA applies to a contract for a Mississippi agency to buy electricity from a corporation in Kentucky); Island Creek Coal Sales Co.
v. City of Gainesville, 764 F.2d 437 (6th Cir.) (per parties' agreement, applied the FAA to
an agreement for Florida City to buy coal to be extracted in Kentucky), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 948 (1985); Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979)
(applying the FAA to a contract between Alaska residents and a Florida corporation for the
construction of a boat in Florida for sale to Alaskans for use in Alaska); Medical Dev. Corp.
v. Indus. Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345, 346-47 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying the FAA to a
contract under which a California corporation agreed to sell goods to a Utah corporation,
F.O.B. Los Angeles); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409
(2d Cir. 1959) (applying the FAA to a purchase of wool by a corporation in Massachusetts
from a corporation in New York); Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 117-18
(6th Cir.) (applying the FAA to a contract under which a Kentucky mill purchased textile
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transactions "involve" interstate commerce under any standard, 233
regardless of whether the sale is between merchants or to a consumer. 5 Sales contracts between citizens of the same state also
"involve" interstate commerce when performance of the contract requires goods to be shipped across state lines.2m
fibers from a New York broker to be delivered from Brazil), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953); Nat'l Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco Int'l, Inc., No. 90-682-CMW, 1991 WL 255369 (D.
Del. Nov. 12, 1991) (applying the FAA to a contract for international sale of oil), aff'd, No.
91-3879, 1992 WL 381723 (3rd Cir. Dec. 28, 1992); China Resource Prod. (U.S.A.) Ltd. v.
Fayda Int'l, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1101, 1102, 1104-05 (D. Del. 1990) (applying the FAA to a
contract between a Delaware buyer and a New York seller for the sale of aluminum to be
imported from China); Pennsylvania Data Entry, Inc. v. Nixdorf Computer Corp., 762 F.
Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (applying the FAA to the sale of computer hardware and
software by a Massachusetts company to a Pennsylvania company); China Grove Cotton Mills
Co. v. Industrion, Inc., No. 89 CIV. 7179, 1990 WL 41726, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. April 4,
1990) (applying the FAA to a contract for the sale of yam between a New York buyer and
a North Carolina seller); Diskin v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 652 F. Supp. 553, 559 (D. Mass.)
(applying the FAA to a contract between a Massachusetts wholesale buyer and a New York
seller for the sale of fabric), rev'd, 836 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1987); Lafayette Coal Co. v.
Gilman Paper Co., 640 F. Supp. 1, 1 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (applying the FAA without dispute to
a coal supply agreement between an Illinois corporation and a New Hampshire corporation
with coal to be delivered to defendant's Georgia facility); Pioneer Supply Co. v. American
Meter Co., 484 F. Supp. 227, 228-29 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Garner Lumber Co. v. Randolph E.
Valensi, Lange, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 161 (W.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir.
1975); Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 486
F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc.,
334 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that international shipment involves
commerce under FAA); United Aircraft Int'l, Inc. v. Greenlandair, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 1329,
1330 (D. Conn.) (applying the FAA to a contract under which an American corporation sold
,helicopters to a Denmark corporation based in Greenland), aff'd, 410 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1969); In re Prouvost Lefebvre of Rhode Island, 105 F. Supp. 757, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Er
parte Warrior Basin Gas Co., 512 So. 2d 1364, 1369 (Ala. 1987) (applying the FAA to a
contract for the sale of natural gas with delivery into interstate pipeline); ESAB Automation,
Inc. v. Hesco Sales, Inc., 582 So.2d 810, 810-11 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991) (applying the
FAA to a contract under which a Florida corporation buys a robot welder from a Colorado
corporation, with shipment and correspondence between the two states); Bunge Corp. v.
Perryville Feed & Produce, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (applying the
FAA to a contract by a New York corporation to buy soy beans from a Missouri corporation
with delivery in Illinois); Yale Materials Handling Corp. v. White Storage & Retrieval Sys.,
Inc., 573 A.2d 484 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); In re Mostek Corp., 502 N.Y.S.2d 181
(App. Div. 1986); In re Cone Mills Corp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1982); Lory Fabrics, Inc. v. Dress Rehearsal, Inc., 434 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 1980); Buck Creek Indus.,
Inc. v. Beattle Mfg. Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1978); In re Omnium Freighting
Corp., 185 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Wineland v. Marketex Int'l, Inc., 627 P.2d 967
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
233. Cf. Warrior Basin Gas Co., 512 So. 2d at 1365, 1369 (applying Judge Lumbard's
test to find that a contract between an in-state natural gas supplier and an out-of-state natural
gas purchaser involved interstate commerce).
234. See cases cited supra note 232.
235. See Wick, 605 F.2d at 168 n.4.
236. See Missouri ex rel. St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Donelson, 631 S.W.2d 887,
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Sales contracts in which an in-state seller delivers goods within
the state to an out-of-state buyer presents a closer question. A number
of courts have said that a contract does not "involve" interstate commerce just because it is between citizens of different states."
Nonetheless, most courts have held that such transactions "involve"
interstate commerce, at least when the seller anticipates that the buyer
will place the goods in interstate commerce. 238 Likewise, one court
held this type of local sale to "involve" interstate commerce because
completion of the transaction required one of the parties to move
personnel and payments across state lines."'
The involvement of interstate commerce is even less clear when
the buyer is a consumer and the goods are already in the buyer's
state prior to the transaction. Since most goods, or at least their component parts, usually travel in interstate commerce, one could legitimately interpret even these intrastate consumer transactions to involve
interstate commerce. A California resident's purchase of a car from a
California retailer could be deemed to "involve" interstate commerce,
for example, because the retailer previously purchased the car from a
Michigan manufacturer. In addition, given the mobile nature and purpose of a car, one might assume that the buyer will use the car in
interstate commerce. Certainly, such consumer transactions "affect"
commerce and thus are governed by the FAA if the broad "affecting"
890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a sales contract between two Missouri corporations
requiring shipment of coal from seller's Iowa facility to buyer's Missouri facility involved
interstate commerce).
237. See, e.g., Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384
(2d Ctr.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver
Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 822 (N.C. 1981).
238. See O'Meara v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 230 F. Supp. 788, 790-91 (N.D. Ill.
1964) (holding that a contract for the sale of natural gas from the plaintiff's Louisiana well
to be delivered to defendant's Louisiana processing plant "involved" commerce since plaintiff
sought and received from the Federal Power Commission a certificate giving the plaintiff
permission to sell natural gas to defendant for resale in interstate commerce); McEntire v.
Monarch Feed Mills, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Ark. 1982) (holding that a contract by
an Arkansas resident to sell and deliver grain to a Missouri corporation's Arkansas plant
"involved" interstate commerce since the buyer had plants in both Arkansas and Missouri and
was in the business of buying and selling grain in both states). But see Deep South Oil Co.
of Tex. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328 S.W.2d 897, 905-06 ('ex. Civ. App. 1959) (holding that a
contract by a Texas gas supplier to sell gas to a buyer that processes the gas in the same
county did not "involve" interstate commerce despite the buyer's subsequent sale of the gas
in interstate commerce).
239. See Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d
238, 243 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a contract between citizens of different states for the
intrastate sale- of natural gas "involved" interstate commerce since the contract necessitated
"interstate travel of both personnel and payments").
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commerce standard is applied.'u Nonetheless, the essential transaction between the parties to a consumer sale takes place entirely in
one state. If the courts use a narrower interpretation of "involving"
commerce, therefore, the FAA likely would not apply to these transactions.
Only a handful of reported cases address the applicability of the
FAA to such intrastate consumer transactions, but each held the FAA
inapplicable. Two cases have held that:

mhe sale in Alabama of an automobile manufactured outside of
Alabama to an Alabama resident who is buying it as a consumer
and not for commercial purposes, is not a contract involving "interstate commerce," as that term is used in the FAA, where the seller
has its only place of business in Alabama... and all obligations
arising out of the contract are to be performed in Alabama." 1
Similarly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the FAA did
not apply to a North Carolina resident's lease of a tractor already
located at a North Carolina dealership.2 42 The court held that the
FAA did not apply even though the lessor was a Minnesota corporation and payments were made to Minnesota, with the North Carolina
dealer acting only as leasing agent. Significantly, all three of these
cases were decided by courts that apply Judge Lumbard's "involving
commerce" test under which courts inquire whether the parties contemplated substantial interstate activity.243
2. Construction Contracts
Like intrastate consumer transactions, construction contracts appear at first to be essentially local in nature,244 and many parties to
240. Cf.Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (holding that a farmer's action
of growing wheat for consumption on his own farm affects interstate commerce and thus is
subject to congressional regulation).
241. Ex parte Williams, 555 So. 2d 146, 148 (Ala. 1989); see also Ex parte Warren,
548 So. 2d 157, 159-60 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989).
242. See Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group Leasing Co., 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C.
CL App. 1984).
243. See Warren, 548 So. 2d at 159-60; Paramore, 316 S.E.2d at 92; see also supra
notes 175-201.
244. See Bryant-Durham Elec. Co. v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 256 S.E.2d 529, 532
(N.C. CL App. 1979) ("The construction of the Durham County General Hospital was not an
act in interstate commerce and we hold the [FAA] does not apply."). But see Burke County
Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 818-19, 821-24 & n.12 (N.C.

1981) (applying the FAA to a contract for architectural services, suggesting that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals' interpretation of "involving" commerce was too restrictive and
that construction contracts may involve commerce).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/3

48

Strickland: The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: Wh
19921

FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

construction contracts have argued on that basis that, the FAA does
not apply to construction contracts.24 5 One contractor argued, for
example, that its contract was "one for construction in a single county
in Kentucky and that the transaction should be characterized as 'construction not comnnerce. '"' 2
Yet despite this appearance, a great many cases apply the FAA
to construction contracts because the contractor or the owner resides
in a state other than the state where the construction takes place.247
Many of these cases also rely on the fact that materials used on the
project come from out of state or other contractors or workers on the
project come from another state.2 A number of cases even apply

245. See, e.g., Monte v. Southern Del. County Auth., 321 F.2d 870, 871-72 (3d Cir.
1963).
246. Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v. MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Ky. 1977).
247. See Maxum Found., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985);
Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. City of Huntsville, 748 F.2d 573, 574-75 (11th Cir. 1984); American
Home Assurance Co. v. Veco Concrete Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 961, 963 (4th Cir. 1980);
Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1980);
LS.&H. Constr. Co. v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d 212, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1973);
Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268, 1271-73 (2d Cir. 1971);
Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967); Monte, 321 F.2d
at 871-72; Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); Nuclear Installation Servs. Co. v. Nuclear Servs. Corp.,
468 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Schulman Inv. Co. v. Olin Corp., 458 F. Supp.
186, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Harman Elec. Constr. Co. v. Consolidated Eng'g Co., 347 F.
Supp. 392, 396 (D. Del. 1972); Ex parte Costa & Head (Atrium), Ltd., 486 So. 2d 1272,
1275 (Ala. 1986); University Casework Sys., Inc. v. Bahre, 362 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind. CL
App. 1977); Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Assn, 326 N.E.2d 844, 852-53
(Ind. CL App. 1975); Fite & Warmath, 559 S.W.2d at 734; Tennessee River Pulp & Paper
Co. v. Eichleay Corp., 637 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tenn. 1982); see also Wilson Elec. Contractors,
Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 168 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that it is
undisputed that the contract involved commerce); City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc.,
721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying the FAA because the parties agreed that the
contract involved interstate commerce); United States v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc.,
364 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir.) (suggesting that the contract likely involves commerce but does
not decide the issue), cert. dismissed 385 U.S. 924 (1966). But see Benihana Lombard Corp.
v. Frank Annino & Sons Constr. Co., No. 86 C 6418, 1987 WL 5955, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 29, 1987) (concluding without explanation that a contract between a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Illinois, and a California corporation under which
the California corporation agrees to build a restaurant in Illinois, did not involve interstate
commerce under the FAA).
248. See Maxum Found, 779 F.2d at 978 n.4; American Home, 629 F.2d at 963; Metro
Indus., 287 F.2d at 384; Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp. v. Islip Resource Recovery Agency, 710
F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Thomas O'Connor & Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
697 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D. Mass. 1988); Winter Constr. Co. v. Lamas Constructors, Inc.,
CIV.A.C87-1937A, 1987 WL 60203, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 1987); G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Metric Constructors, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Starr Ele. Co. v. Basic
Constr. Co., 586 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (M.D.N.C. 1982) (applying the FAA to a contract
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the FAA to construction contracts in which the owner, the contractor,
and the construction site are all in the same state. These cases find
that the contract "involves" interstate commerce because the project
uses materials, workers, or subcontractors from other states.249 A
few cases even rely partly on the fact that the completed building
will be used in commerce or to facilitate commerce."
Only a handful of cases have held the FAA inapplicable to a
construction project because it did not "involve" interstate comnierce," and those cases have questionable precedential value. The

between a Virginia contractor and a North Carolina electrical subcontractor for work on a
North Carolina project for which materials were ordered from out of state); John Ashe Assoc.
v. Envirogenics Co., 425 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Warren Bros. Co. v. Community Bldg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 656, 664-65 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Glenwal Co., 325 F. Supp. 86, 89-90 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 442 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1971);
Younker Bros., Inc. v. Standard Constr. Co., 241 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D. Iowa 1965); Costa &
Head, 486 So. 2d at 1275; Pathman Constr. Co., 326 N.E.2d at 852-53; Fite & Warmath,
559 S.W.2d at 734; Tennessee River, 637 S.W.2d at 855.
249. See Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 147-48 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Neumann Caribbean Int'l, Ltd., 750 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (9th Cir.
1985); C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships, 375 F. Supp.
446, 449-51 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Falcon Steel Co. v. Weber Eng'g Co., 517 A.2d 281, 284
(Del. Ch. 1986); Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334, 337 (Del. Super. Ct.
1973); ADC Constr. Co. v. McDaniel Grading, Inc., 338 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (Ga. CL App.
1985); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127, 130-31 (Kan.
Ct App. 1982); Northwest Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 522, 52324 (Minn. 1979); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647, 652 (S.C.
1977); Circle S. Enters. v. Stanley Smith & Sons, 343 S.E.2d 45, 47 (S.C. CL App. 1986);
Lost Creek Mun. Util. Dist. v. Travis Indus. Painters, 827 S.W.2d 103, 104-05 (rex. Ct.
App. 1992).
250. See R.J. Palmer Constr. Co., 642 P.2d at 130 (noting that "the building presumably
was to be used to house and sell musical instruments and related items that would be moved
in interstate commerce").
251. See Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 278 (5th Cir. 1947) (holding
that the FAA did not apply to a contract between a Minnesota contractor and a Texas owner
for the construction of 150 buildings and grading and paving of streets in Texas); Benihana
Lombard Corp. v. Frank Annino & Sons Constr. Co., No. 86 C 6418, 1987 WL 5955, at *3
n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1987) (concluding without explanation that a contract between a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois and a California corporation under which the California corporation agrees to build a restaurant in Illinois, did not
involve interstate commerce under the FAA); W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nazareth Literary &
Benevolent Inst., 113 F. Supp. 564, 565, 571 (E.D. Ark. 1953) (holding that a contract
between an Oklahoma contractor and a Kentucky benevolent association for the construction
of an infirmary in Arkansas did not involve commerce under the FAA); H.L. Fuller Constr.
Co. v. Industrial Dev. Bd., 590 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1991); Bryant-Durham Elec. Co. v. Durham
County Hosp. Corp., 256 S.E.2d 529, 532 (N.C. CL App. 1979); see also McDonough
Constr. v. Harner, 232 F. Supp. 887, 890 (M.D.N.C. 1964) (holding that a construction contract under which a Florida contractor agreed to construct an office and warehouse building
in North Carolina did not involve interstate commerce under the FAA). But see Starr Elec.
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North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "[t]he construction of the
Durham County General Hospital was not an act in interstate commerce and ...
[the FAA] does not apply."252 A later decision by
the North Carolina Supreme Court, however, likely has overruled that
case.

253

Likewise, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to apply the FAA
to a construction contract in its initial opinion in H.L Fuller Construction Co. v. Industrial Development Board.'4 The court stated:
[W]e conclude that the transaction in dispute did not involve interstate commerce, as contemplated by the FAA. Our conclusion is
predicated on the following facts: (1) All of the parties to the controversy are Alabama corporations; (2) the contract was to be executed solely within the State of Alabama; and (3) all obligations
arising out of the contract were to be performed solely within the
State of Alabama. 5
The court withdrew that opinion, however, after granting the parties'
petition for rehearing. 2- On rehearing, the court applied the FAA,
but only because both parties agreed throughout the litigation that it
applied. 2 7 Recent decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court suggest
that it has joined the consensus reached by other courts that nearly all
construction contracts "involve" interstate commerce and are subject
to the FAA. 5

Co. v. Basic Constr. Co., 586 F. Supp. 964, 966 (M.D.N.C. 1982) (applying the FAA to a
contract between a Virginia contractor and a North Carolina electrical subcontractor for work
on a North Carolina project for which materials were ordered from out of state); Warren
Bros. Co. v. Community Bldg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 656, 664-65 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (holding
that the North Carolina construction by a Georgia contractor involved commerce under the
FAA because workers, materials, and surety bonds for the project came from other states).
252. Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., 256 S.E.2d at 532.
253. See Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816,
818-19, 821-23 & n.12 (N.C. 1981) (applying the FAA to a contract for architectural services, suggested that the North Carolina Court of Appeals' interpretation of "involving" commerce was too restrictive and that construction contracts may involve commerce).
254. 590 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1991).
255. 1991 WL 170853, at *2 (this initial opinion was replaced by 590 So. 2d 218 (Ala.
1991)).
256. H.L .Fuller Constr., 590 So. 2d at 219.
257. Id. at 221.
258. See Ex parte Brice Bldg. Co., 607 So. 2d 132 (Ala. 1992) (holding that a construction contract involved commerce because out-of-state materials and an out-of-state subcontractor were used on the project); Maxus, Inc. v. Sciacca, 598 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Ala.
1992) (holding that a contract for the construction of a house involved commerce because
materials were shipped from other states; the mall system was used to send payments interstate; and the national banking system was used for holding, investing, and dispersing escrow
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3. Employment and Personal Service Contracts
Application of the FAA to employment contracts and personal
service contracts has proven over the years to be more complicated
than its application to other contracts. First, early cases held that the
FAA did not apply to certain personal service contracts because they
did not "involve" commerce." 9 In addition, the FAA expressly excludes certain employment contracts from its coverage.2" Although
the early case law and the exclusion in § 1 of the FAA stood as
potential barriers to the application of the FAA to employment contracts, courts now apply the FAA to employment contracts almost as
they would any other contract.
The early cases held that the FAA did not apply to certain personal service contracts, particularly contracts for the services of entertainers, because they did not "involve" commerce. 26 1 In one of the
most famous cases to take this position, Conley v. San Carlo Opera
Co., 262 the Second Circuit held that a contract for the services of an

opera singer did not "involve" commerce within the meaning of the
FAA, even though the contract required the singer to travel and perform in several states.263 Another court held that a minor league
baseball manager's contract did not "involve" commerce even though
it required him to travel to several states.2"
Recent cases have rejected those decisions, except perhaps as
applied to baseball.2 65 In Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball
Club,266 for example, the Second Circuit expressly criticized its earlier decision in Conley. The court noted that Conley was based on
early Supreme Court rulings that baseball is not "commerce" and thus
not subject to federal regulation under Congress' commerce pow-

funds).
259. See Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947) (per curiam);
Livingston v. Shreveport-Texas League Baseball Corp., 128 F. Supp. 191, 202 & n.8 (W.D.
La. 1955), aff'4 228 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1956).
260. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
261. See Conley, 163 F.2d at 311; Livingston, 128 F. Supp. at 202 & n.8; Pappas v.
American Guild of Variety Artists, 125 F. Supp. 343, 346-47 (N.D. 111.1954).
262. 163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947).
263. See id.
264. See Livingston, 128 F. Supp. at 202 & n.8.
265. See Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816,
820-21 (N.C. 1981); Bennish v. N6rth Carolina Dance Theater, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 335 (N.C.
CL App. 1992).

266. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
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er.267 Later Supreme Court cases, the Second Circuit noted, have
held those rulings to be "an aberration confined to baseball. "2 s The
Second Circuit thus held that a contract to play professional basketball throughout the country
"involved" interstate commerce within the
269
meaning of the FAA.
Even if an employment contract involves interstate commerce,
the FAA still may not be applicable. Section 1 of the FAA specifically excludes from the Act's coverage "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 2 0 A broad interpretation of this exclusion could exclude nearly all employment contracts from the
FAA's coverage. The courts have consistently construed this provision, however, to exclude from the FAA only employment contracts
of workers engaged in the actual movement of goods across state
lines or work closely related to that movement.27 '
Except for workers involved in actual interstate transportation,
therefore, the FAA applies to employment contracts to the same extent as it applies to any other contract.2' Numerous cases apply the
FAA to employment contracts under which the employee's duties
directly involve interstate commerce.
Courts have applied the

267. See Erving, 468 F.2d at 1069. Conley and Livingston relied on Federal Baseball
Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See Conley, 163 F.2d at 311; Livingston, 128
F. Supp. at 202 n.8.
268. Erving, 468 F.2d at 1069 (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)).
269. Id. at 1068-69.
270. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
271. See, e.g., Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) ("Courts have
generally limited this exception to employees . . . involved in, or closely related to, the
actual movement of goods in interstate commerce."); Signal-Stat Corp. v. United Elec. Radio
& Mach. Workers Local 475, 235 F.2d 298, 301-03 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
911 (1957); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers Local 437, 207
F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that the exclusion applies only to those "classes of
workers engaged directly in commerce, that is, only those other classes of workers who are
actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely
related thereto as to be in practical effect part of it"); Home v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465, 469 (D. Mass. 1980); Donmoor, Inc. v. Sturtevant,
449 So. 2d 869, 870-72 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984). For analysis of this exclusion and
criticism of the courts' narrow interpretation of it, see Stempel, supra note 136.
272. See, e.g., Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 785 (holding that "the creation of an employment
relationship which involves commerce is a sufficient 'transaction' to fall within section 2 of
the IFAA]").
273. See Corion Corp. v. Chen, No. CIV.A. 91-11792-Y, 1991 WL 280288, at *3-4 (D.
Mass. Dec. 27, 1991) (applying the FAA to an employment contract between a manufacturing
manager, who resided and worked in Connecticut, and his employer, a Massachusetts corporation based in Massachusetts, partly because the employee was engaged in interstate com-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

53

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:385

FAA regularly to employment contracts of sales representatives that
require the employee to travel and make sales calls in several
states,274 and to other employment contracts that require the employee to travel across state lines. 75 Likewise, innumerable cases apply
the FAA to employment contracts between stock brokers and securities traders and their employers. 6

merce), appeal denied, 964 F.2d 55 (Ist Cir. 1992); Graphic Scanning Corp. v. Yampol, 688
F. Supp. 857, 859 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying the FAA to an employment contract of the chief
executive officer of a company whose communications business covers three states), affd,
850 F.2d 131 (2d Cit. 1988); Frank Fiore Enters., Inc. v. Francis, No. 86 Civ. 7241 (WCC),
1987 WL 9429, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1987) (holding that a contract under which Connie
Francis employed petitioner as her personal manager for all professional activities in the
entertainment industry "throughout the world" involved interstate commerce); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 716, 719 (E.D.N.Y.) (holding that a contract
to play professional basketball involves commerce under the FAA), affrd, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d
Cir. 1972); Benish v. North Carolina Dance Theater, Inc., 422 S.E.2d 335, 337 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that a contract to perform in dance productions in several states involves
commerce).
274. See Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 37 (7th Cir. 1976) (employer manufactured and distributed goods in interstate commerce and the contract required the employee
to visit the employer's customers in nine states four times each year); Miller v. Puritan
Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex. CL App. 1974) (applying the FAA to an employment contract for a sales representative whose territory covered five states); Mamlin v.
Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634, 635-36 (Tex. CL App. 1973) (the FAA applied to an
employment contract of a sales representative whose territory included six states); see also
Donmoor, Inc. v. Sturtevant, 449 So. 2d 869, 870 n.1, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
275. See Varley v. Tarrytown Assoc., Inc., 477 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying
the FAA to a contract for plaintiff to act as a textile consultant for defendant throughout the
United States with plaintiff evaluating plants and fabrics all over the country); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the FAA to
a contract to play professional basketball throughout the United States); O'Rear v. American
Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, 784 F. Supp. 1561, 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (applying the FAA to an employment contract of regional sales coordinator of insurance company).
276. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted and vacated, 111 S. CL 2050 (1991); Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 809, 813-14 (4th Cir. 1989); Bayma v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham and
Co., 784 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1986); Barrowelough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752
F.2d 923, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1985); Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (lth Cir. 1985);
Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1211-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
949 (1972); Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 784-85; Benestad v. Interstate/Johnson Lake Corp., 752 F.
Supp. 1054, 1055 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 946 F.2d 1546 (lth
Cir. 1991); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359,
1362-66 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Sharpe v. Kidder Peabody & Co., No. CIV. 4-88-164, 1988 WL
60795, at *2 (D. Minn. June 13, 1988); Cullen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
587 F. Supp. 1520, 1522 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Shubert, 577 F. Supp. 406, 407 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. DeCaro, 577 F. Supp. 616, 618-22 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472, 1474-75 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Shearson Hayden
Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 493 F. Supp. 104, 106 (N.D. 111. 1980) (stating that "[t]he contract
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At least one court has indicated that an employment contract
"involves" commerce if the employer carries on interstate business
operations. 2' Applying the "affecting" commerce standard, the court
in GAF Corp. v. Werner278 held that the FAA was applicable to a
contract between GAF and the former chairman of its board of directors.27 9 The scope of GAFs precedential value, however, is perhaps
limited, because the duties of the "employee" in that case actually
touched every aspect of the company's extensive international operation. There are no reported cases addressing the application of the
FAA to lower level employees who work locally for interstate companies.
In Ex parte Clements,2 " a case in which the employer's interstate activities were less apparent than in GAF Corp., a different
court found that the employment contract of a company vice president
did not "involve" interstate commerce. 21 ' That case concerned a
stock purchase agreement. The contract provided that Communications
Resources, Inc. would employ Clements as vice president and that
Clements would not compete with Communications Resources within
the states of Alabama, Florida, or Louisiana.8 2 Communications Resources sought to compel arbitration of an ensuing dispute pursuant to
the FAA. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the FAA did not
apply. It said:
The fact that the covenant not to compete extended to Florida

between a New York Stock Exchange brokerage firm and its employee is a contract involving interstate commerce governed by the [FAA]"), aft'd, 653 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1981); Legg,
Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1370-71 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding
that an employment contract of securities brokers "involved commerce" and thus the FAA
applied to an employer's business tort claims against former employees arising from their
competition with employer); Ross Stebbins, Inc. v. Nystrum, 422 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (Fla.
Dist. CL App. 1982); Kaufman v. Chicago Corp., 466 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Mich. CL App.
1991), appeal denied, 482 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. 1992); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v.
McKay, 763 S.W.2d 934, 936 n.3 (Tex. CL App. 1989); White-Weld & Co. v. Mosser, 587
S.W.2d 485, 486-87 (Tex. CL App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
277. See GAP Corp. v. Werner, 484 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (App. Div.), rev'd on other
grounds, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986); see also Zell v.
Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 37 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting the interstate and international
nature of the employer's business in determining that the FAA applied to the employment
contract of a sales representative required to travel a nine state area).
278. 484 N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 495 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986).
279. Id. at 13, 15.
280. 587 So. 2d 317 (Ala. 1991).
281. Id. at 319.
282. Id. at 318.
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and Louisiana, standing alone, does not provide a sufficient nexus
with interstate commerce activity. Based on the facts before us, we
are compelled to conclude that the evidence in the record is not
sufficient to support a finding that the agreement has a sufficient
nexus with interstate commerce 3activity to bring the agreement
within the coverage of the FAA.s

4. Service Contracts
The early hesitancy of the courts to apply the FAA to personal
service contracts did not stop them from applying it to other types of
service contracts. 2 Courts thus regularly apply the FAA to contracts under which a business agrees to provide services in another
state.285 They also apply the FAA when the services themselves di-

283. Id at 319. Communications Resources alleged that it engaged in the sale of telecommunications equipment throughout Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and other states, but
Clements denied that the company made other than "infrequent and sporadic sales" outside of
Alabama. Id
284. See Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Nordstjeman, 145 N.Y.S.2d
466, 467-68 (App. Div. 1955) (applying the FAA to a contract between a wood pulp exporter and steamship lines under which the exporter agreed to use the steamship lines exclusively
in exchange for lower rates).
285. See Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1581 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying the FAA to a contract for the bank's valuation of assets located throughout the country);
McGuire, Comwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (D. Colo. 1991) (applying
the FAA to an agreement between attorney and client under which they agreed to arbitrate
fee disputes and claims regarding the law frmn's handling of the client's matter, where it was
"uncontested that the fee arrangements evidence[d] a transaction involving interstate commerce"); Ralco Enters., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 738 F. Supp.
515, 517 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that a stock brokerage agreement between a Georgia
corporation and the Florida and Utah offices of a Delaware corporation for the trading of
stocks on a national exchange involves commerce under the FAA); LeJacq Publishing, Inc. v.
American Soc'y of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery, and Opthamology, No. 88 CIV. 7242
(MJL), 1989 WL 37673, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1989) (applying the FAA to a contract
under which a New York corporation agrees to publish and distribute journals for an Illinois
society); Ashi Int'l, Inc. v. N.L. Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A.H-85-5775, 1987 WL 14365, at *1-2
(S.D. Tex. June 15, 1987) (holding that a contract under which plaintiff agreed to act as a
Texas corporation's sales representative in India involved commerce under the FAA); Block
175 Corp. v. Fairmont Hotel Mgmt. Co., 648 F. Supp. 450, 451 (D. Colo. 1986) (applying
the FAA to a contract under which a California corporation agrees to manage a Colorado
hotel); URS Co.-Kansas City v. Titus County Hosp. Dist., 604 F. Supp. 423, 424 n.2 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (holding that a contract for architectural services between a Missouri architectural
firmand a Texas hospital district relating to a hospital in Texas involved commerce under
the FAA); First Citizens Mun. Corp. v. Pershing Div. of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec.
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 884, 887 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that a contract under which a
Delaware corporation provides services to a Georgia broker-dealer in connection with the sale
of municipal securities involves commerce under the FAA); Hartford Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Florida
Software Serv., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (D. Me. 1982) (holding that it is undisputed
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rectly relate to interstate commerce," 6 or when performance of the
service requires additional transactions in interstate commerce.287
that a contract under which a Connecticut partnership made up of Connecticut and Maryland
corporations agreed to provide data processing services to a Maine corporation involved
commerce under the FAA), appeal dismissed, 712 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1983); Wydel Assoc. v.
Thermasol, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 739, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (relating to a contract between
Texas and New York companies for the installation and maintenance of steam bath units);
Bartell Media Corp. v. Fawcett Printing Corp., 342 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(holding that a contract under which a Kentucky corporation printed magazine for a New
York publisher involved commerce under the FAA); Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc. v. Newman,
356 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172-73 (Sup. CL 1974) (applying the FAA to a contract to transport an
automobile from the owner's home in Illinois to California); Burke County Pub. Sch. Bd. of
Educ. v. Shaver Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 818-19, 821-24 & n.12 (N.C. 1981) (applying
the FAA to a contract whereby an architectural firm with its main office in Indiana agreed to
provide architectural services in the construction of schools in North Carolina, where the
principal architect resides in Indiana, most of the architectural work is done in Indiana, and
engineers and materials from other states are used in the construction project); see also Ex
parte Shamrock Food Sere., Inc., 514 So. 2d 921, 921 (Ala. 1987) (holding without explanation that a contract between a food service company and a college involves interstate commerce); Atlantic Painting & Contracting, Inc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 844
(Ky. 1984) (applying the FAA to a contract to paint a bridge spanning across the Ohio River
between Kentucky and Illinois). But see Action CATV, Inc. v. Wildwood Partners, Ltd., 508
So. 2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the FAA does not apply to a
contract between a New Jersey partnership and a Connecticut corporation under which the
Connecticut corporation manages a cable television system in Florida for the partnership,
because the Connecticut corporation was an assignee-not the original contracting party, and
the original contract did not contemplate substantial interstate activity).
286. See Block 175 Corp., 648 F. Supp. at 451 (holding the FAA applicable to a
contract to manage a hotel partly because the "hotel business is designed to accommodate
interstate travellers"); Litton RCS, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 376 F. Supp. 579,
585-87 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (involving a contract to develop and install toll collection equipment
for the Pennsylvania turnpike), aff'd 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975); Zenol, Inc. v. Carblox,
Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 866, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (involving a contract to act as an agent for an
English manufacturer to sell its products in the United States), aff'd 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.
1973); Saucy Susan Prod., Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 724, 726-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (applying the FAA to a contract under which a New York corporation
manufactured products for a New Jersey corporation under the latter's trademark and the
products were sold in interstate commerce); Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Nordstjeman, 141 F. Supp. 220, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that a rate agreement between
an American corporation and a Swedish steamship involved commerce under the FAA);
Newman, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (applying the FAA to a contract to transport automobile from
the owner's home in Illinois to California); see also Miller v. Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc., 434
F. Supp. 40, 41-43 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (holding the FAA applicable to a contract for interstate
transport of an automobile but also holding the arbitration clause to be void because it was
unconscionable and violated 49 U.S.C. §§ 20(11)-316(b) (the Interstate Commerce Act)), af'd
614 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 918 (1980).
287. See RPJ Energy Fund Management, Inc. v. Collins, 552 F. Supp. 946, 949 (D.
Minn. 1982) (the FAA applies to a contract between a Minnesota corporation and a Kentucky
citizen under which the Kentucky citizen agrees to drill and operate oil and gas wells in
Kentucky, where the operation required the purchase of drilling equipment outside the state
and the Minnesota corporation sent personnel to Kentucky to assist in the operation).
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Numerous cases, for example, apply the FAA to stockbrokers' customer agreements and other such contracts for services relating to the
and sale of securities on national and international exchangpurchase
8
es.

28

Significantly, the only reported cases that apply the FAA to
service contracts entered by a consumer are those in which the ser-

288. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d
1049, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1990); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 509-10 (3d Cir.
1990); Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218, 1219-21 (6th Cir. 1989); Cohen v. Wedbush,
Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988); Bhatia v. Johnston, 818 F.2d 418,
419 (5th Cir. 1987); Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
482 U.S. 927 (1987); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1986);
Mihalakis v. Pacific Brokerage Seres., Inc., No. 91 CIV. 994 (CSH), 1991 WL 280236, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1991); Realco Enter, 738 F. Supp. at 517; Axtell v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 194, 195 (E.D. Ark. 1989); Amodio v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., 715 F. Supp. 32, 33-35 (D. Conn. 1989); LeFoy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. CIV.A.CV89PT0296E, 1989 WL 80444, at *3 (N.D. Ala. April
14, 1989); Cohen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 87 C 5678, 1989 WL 157928, at *1 (N.D. I11.
Dec. 11, 1989); Ottenritter v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 980, 986 (D. Md.
1989); Schuster v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Curtis v.
Newhard, Cook & Co., 725 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (E.D. Mo. 1989); Singer v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 699 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Cohen v. Cowen Sec., Inc., No. 89-8090-CIVPAINE, 1989 WL 222963, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 21, 1989); Brick v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
677 F. Supp. 1251, 1253-54 (D.D.C. 1987); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey/American Express,
Inc., No. CIV.A.85-115-1-MAC, 1986 WL 2696, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 1986); Ferreri v.
First Options of Chicago, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 427, 432-33 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Fim v. Davis,
610 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Walch v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 841127 Civ.-T-10, 1985 WL 1786, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 1985); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 4-81-394, 1984 WL 2462, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1984);
Speck v. Oppenheimer & Co., 583 F. Supp. 325, 328 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Corey v. New York
Stock Exch., 493 F. Supp. 51, 54 (W.D. Mich. 1980), af'd, 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982);
Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 384 F. Supp. 21, 24 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Ex parte
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fener & Smith, Inc., 494 So. 2d 1, 2 n.1 (Ala. 1986); Ayers v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 762 P.2d 743, 744 (Colo. CL App. 1988); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So. 2d 858, 858-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
approved, 476 So. 2d 140 (Fla..1985); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal,
239 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ga. CL App. 1977); Geldermann, Inc. v. Stathis, 532 N.E.2d 366, 368
(Ill. Ct. App. 1988); Loche v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1296, 1300-01 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1988); Passage v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 727 P.2d 1298, 1301 (Mont. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 905 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Roven, 609 P.2d 720, 722
(N.M. 1980); Allen & Co. v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (App.
Div. 1985), af'd, 490 N.E.2d 850 (N.Y. 1986); Athenian Trader Enter. Corp. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. CA2311, 1985 WL 7270, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 16, 1985); Garmo v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 681 P.2d 253, 255 (Wash. 1984). But
c.f. Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 362-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that a contract under which a Delaware corporation, acting through
its Paris office, purchased commodities futures for a foreign national on the London Commodities Exchange did not involve commerce within the meaning of the FAA because the
transaction did not involve the foreign commerce of the United States).
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vice relates to interstate commerce. Many of the cases applying the
FAA to stockbrokers' customer agreements involve individual investors. 289 Likewise, at least one court has applied the FAA to a contract to transport an individual's automobile from one state to another.2' ° No reported cases, however, address the applicability of the
FAA to a contract between a business in one state to provide a local
service for a consumer in another state. Such a contract appears likely
to "involve" interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, however,
unless the personnel, equipment, and supplies needed to provide the
service are already in the consumer's state.
5.

Business Relationship Contracts: Partnerships,
Joint Ventures, and Franchise Contracts
A number of cases apply the FAA to contracts that establish
ongoing business relationships. Partnership agreements, for example,
"involve" commerce within the meaning of the FAA when the partners reside in different states and the partnership does business in
more than one state.29 ' A partnership agreement between residents

289.

See Webb, 800 F.2d at 807; Axtell, 744 F. Supp. at 195; LeFoy v. Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., No. CIV.A. CV89PT0296E, 1989 WL 80444, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
April 14, 1989); Passage, 727 P.2d at 1299.
290. See Newman, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (applying the FAA to a contract for the transport of an automobile from the owner's home in Illinois to California).
291. See Hoffelder v. Zinzow, No. 90 C 5450, 1991 WL 104178, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
June
12, 1991) (applying the FAA to a partnership agreement to develop land where partners
reside in Wisconsin and land is located in Illinois); Com-Tech Assocs. v. Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying the FAA to a partnership
agreement to develop and market a computer tape system for IBM computers); Cohoon v.
Ziman, 298 S.E.2d 729, 731 (N.C. CL App. 1983) (applying the FAA to a partnership
agreement between a resident of North Carolina and a resident of South Carolina, where the
partnership was formed as a real estate business and owned land in both North and South
Carolina, the partnership agreement was signed in South Carolina, the partnership's principal
office was to be in North Carolina, all partnership funds were to be deposited in North
Carolina banks, the partners traveled outside their home states on partnership business, and
the partnership employed a North Carolina contractor to build one of its South Carolina shopping centers); see also Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying the FAA
to a contract for the sale, by a New Mexico resident to an Oregon resident, of an undivided
one-half interest in mining claims on property in New Mexico, where the contract not only
provided for interstate payments between the parties but also the development and operation
of the mines and the distribution of the proceeds); Weatherly Cellaphonics Partners v.
Hueber, 726 F. Supp. 319, 323 (D.D.C. 1989) (determining that when a federal agency held
a lottery to distribute cellular phone markets, agreement among numerous participants in the
lottery to buy and sell interests in "winning" entries involved interstate commerce); Lawn v.
Franklin, 328 F. Supp. 791, 794-95 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that a contract under
which Texas residents and a New Jersey resident terminated numerous joint interstate business
enterprises involved commerce under the FAA). But see Wald v. Tauber, No. CV-86-3104,
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of the same state "involves" commerce when the partnership is
formed to engage in 293
activities in another state. 2 2 The same rules
apply to joint ventures.
Likewise, a number of cases apply the FAA to franchise contracts,

2 94

1987 WL 19425, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1987) (holding that a partnership agreement
between citizens of different states which is restricted to real estate activities in New York
does not involve interstate commerce).
292. See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 412, 418 (7th Cir.) (applying the FAA to a
partnership agreement where the partners are both residents of Illinois, the partnership is
managed from Illinois, and the partnership does its banking in Illinois; but the partnership's
business is limited to "the ownership of certain property located in . . . Texas, and to any
property purchased by the partnership within one mile of that property"), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1037 (1984); Seltzer v. Klein, No. C1V.A. 88-6737, 1989 WL 41288, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
April 20, 1989) (involving a partnership to develop, construct, and manage a condominium
project).
293. See Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D. Kan. 1983)
(applying the FAA to contracts under which a resident of Kansas purchased interests in joint
ventures to develop residential real estate in Canada: "Certainly the use of plaintiff's money
to develop and manage Canadian real estate is a transaction involving commerce for purposes
of... the [FAA]"); Masthead Mac Drilling Corp. v. Fleck, 549 F. Supp. 854, 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a joint venture formed to drill for oil in Texas involved
interstate commerce because some matters addressed in the agreement such as money-raising
functions were to be performed in other states); Woodward Pipeline, Inc. v. Reliance Pipeline
Co., 776 S.W.2d 241, 245 (rex. CL App. 1989) (holding without explanation that the joint
venture agreement involved interstate commerce). But see Withers-Busby Group v. Surety
Indus., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 198, 199 (rex. Civ. App. 1976) (affrming the trial court's decision
not to apply the FAA to an "Agreement to Form a Joint Venture" signed before the drafting
of an actual joint venture agreement despite testimony that the parties contemplated "extensive
business in the future on a nationwide scale").
294. See Ommani v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 789 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The
nature of the franchise agreement, involving a contemplated continuous flow of money,
advice, obligations, and benefits between Texas and Connecticut, was clearly in commerce.");
Alpert v. Alphagraphics Franchising, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.NJ. 1990) (applying the
FAA to a franchise contract under which an Arizona franchisor granted a New Jersey franchisee an exclusive territorial franchise to operate an electronic graphics business using the
franchisor's trademark); Karsevar v. Southland Corp., No. CIV.A. 87-672, 1987 WL 6693, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1987); Management Recruiters of Albany, Inc. v. Management Recruit-

ers Int'l, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 750, 752-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Smith v. Pay-Fone Sys., Inc., 627
F. Supp. 121, 123-24 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (applying the FAA to a franchise contract between a
California franchisor and a Georgia franchisee despite a contractual provision that Georgia law
applied); Stodolink v. Yankee Barn Homes, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 557, 558 (D. Conn. 1983)
(holding without dispute that an exclusive direct franchise contract naming plaintiffs as
defendant's exclusive sales representatives in Connecticut and Westchester County, New York
evidenced interstate commerce); Creson v. Quickprint of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 984, 986
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (applying the FAA to a franchise contract that anticipates the exchange of
information and records between an Ohio franchisor and a Missouri franchisee); Weight
Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1057, 1058 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn, 357 F. Supp. 169, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (applying the FAA
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distributorship agreements, 29 and agency agreements?9 between
entities in different states. The decision of the Washington Supreme
Court in Allison v. Medicab International, Inc. 29' is typical. The
plaintiff in Allison entered a franchise agreement under which he
expected to establish a business to provide transportation for the
physically handicapped. 29' The court held that the FAA applied to
the franchise contract because "[tihe transaction involved a New York
corporation and a Washington resident. Franchise payments were

to a New York franchise contract to establish "Jerry Lewis Cinemas" in designated territories
in Georgia); Scanlon v. P&J Enters., Inc., 451 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Mich. App. 1990) ("Because the transfer of marketing expertise from Tennessee to Michigan through the franchise
agreement is a transaction in or affecting interstate commerce, the [FAA] governs."); Downey
v. Christensen, 825 P.2d 557, 559 (Mont. 1992); Sentry Sys., Inc. v. Guy, 654 P.2d 1008,
1008-09 & n.1 (Nev. 1982) (applying the FAA because a franchise agreement on its face
"contemplates an on-going relationship conducting business across state lines," with a Nevada
franchisee agreeing to operate a business in Nevada and pay royalties in exchange for a
California corporation's agreeing to provide training, equipment, follow-up assistance, and use
of its trademark); Cooper v. Computer Credit Sys., Inc., 336 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (App. Div.
1972) (applying the FAA to a contract between a Georgia franchisor and a New York
franchisee); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 382-83 (Wash. 1979); Pinkis v.
Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751, 754 (Wash. CL App. 1973) (applying the FAA to a
franchise contract under which a Delaware corporation agreed to provide a Washington
franchisee with advice, training, educational materials, promotional assistance, advertising, and

films).
295. See Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 472 (2d Cir.
1980); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43 (3d
Cir. 1978) (applying the FAA to an exclusive distributorship agreement between a German

manufacturer and an American distributor); Pervel Indus., Inc. v. TM Wallcovering, Inc., 675
F. Supp. 867, 868-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Pioneer Supply Co. v. American Meter Co., 484 F.
Supp. 227, 228-29 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Coleman v. National Movie-Dine, Inc., 449 F. Supp.
945, 947-48 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (involving a license from a New York corporation to operate a
distributorship of defendant's cinemalrestaurant system in Pennsylvania); Batson Yam &
Fabrics Mach. Group, Inc. v. Saurer-Allma GmbH-Allgauer Maschinenbau, 311 F. Supp. 68,
70 (D.S.C. 1970); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 667
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Sewline Co., 194 F. Supp. 602, 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); In re American Locomotive Co., 87 F. Supp. 754, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1949)
(applying the FAA to a contract under which one corporation becomes the exclusive agent
for the sale of licenses for the use of technical processes owned by another corporation); see
also McCall v. Snap-On Tools Corp., No. CIV.A. 91-4082-JLF, 1991 WL 328468, at *2-3
(S.D. III. Aug. 9, 1991) (applying the FAA to an agreement that terminated a distributorship
agreement).
296. See Kastanias v. Nationwide Auto Transporters, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 720, 721-22
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that a contract under which an interstate automobile transport
company appointed a local agent involved commerce under the FAA because of the nature of
the business); Zenol, Inc. v. Carblox, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 866, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (contract
to act as agent for English manufacturer to sell its products in the United States).
297. 597 P.2d 380 (Wash. 1979) (en banc).
298. Id at 380-81.
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made in New York; supplies were purchased in New York for use in
the state of Washington; and performance of the agreement involved
considerable interstate travel by both parties to the contract."2
Nearly all the reported cases, therefore, apply the FAA to contracts establishing ongoing business relationships. Significantly, all of
these contracts involve either parties from different states or parties in
one state undertaking business ventures in another state. No reported
case applies the FAA to a partnership, joint venture, or franchise
agreement under which parties from the same state agree to do business in the same state. Such a contract clearly would be subject to
the FAA if the "affecting interstate commerce" standard is used, but
the FAA might not apply if a narrower standard is used.
6. Insurance Contracts
Application of the FAA to insurance contracts is more problematic than its application to other types of contracts, because it involves the added consideration of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
The McCarran-Ferguson Act sought to perpetuate state regulation of
the insurance industry free from the impact of certain generally applicable federal laws."' To that end, it provided that: "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business
of insurance."'
Even if an insurance contract involves interstate

299. Id at 382.
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
301. Id. See Stephen Lamson, The Impact of the Federal Arbitration Act and the
McCarren-Ferguson Act on Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 19 CoNN. L. REV. 241, 264
(1987). The McCarran-Ferguson Act was largely a response to United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See id. Supreme Court cases in the nineteenth
century held in other contexts that "insurance was not commerce, interstate or otherwise." Id.
at 256 (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510 (1913);
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1895); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
183 (1868)). It was thus unclear for many years whether Congress had the power to regulate
the insurance industry under its commerce power. In South-Eastern Underwriters, however,
the "Court, in broad language, rejected any idea that the business of insurance was not commerce." Id. at 257. South-Eastern Underwriters thus cleared the way for application of the
FAA and other federal statutes to the insurance industry. See, e.g., Hart v. Orion Ins. Co.,
453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1971). But see Booth v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
285 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D. Neb. 1968) (holding that the South-Eastern Underwriters case
does not hold that individual insurance contracts are commerce), modified, 431 F.2d 212 (8th
Cir. 1970). Congress responded with the McCarran-Ferguson Act to limit the applicability of
federal statutes to the insurance industry. Lamson, supra, at 264.
302. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
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commerce, therefore, the McCarran-Ferguson Act can preclude application of the FAA.
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the FAA applies to insurance
contracts only if its application will not impair state laws enacted to
regulate the business of insurance. 3 Agreements by insurance companies to arbitrate disputes-especially agreements with customers to
arbitrate disputes relating to insurance coverage-probably constitute
"the business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarranFerguson Act.3 4 Consequently, the applicability of the FAA to in-

surance contracts will depend on relevant state law "regulating the
business of insurance" and the extent to which the FAA impairs such
laws."s
State insurance laws that specifically regulate arbitration agreements in insurance contracts and arbitration of insurance disputes'
supersede the FAA regardless of whether they are generally consistent
or inconsistent with it.' Likewise, state laws that specifically require judicial determination of certain disputes relating to insurance
companies preclude arbitration of those disputes under the FAA. °8

303. See id, Lamson, supra note 301, at 264. Professor Lamson summarizes the operation
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act as follows:
In order to establish that an activity is exempt from a particular federal law [under
that Act], one must demonstrate three things: (1) that the federal law in question
does not specifically relate to the business of insurance; (2) that the activity in
question is the "business of insurance"; and (3) that application of federal law
would invalidate, impair or supersede state regulation of the activity.
Id at 264-65. The FAA clearly does not specifically regulate the business of insurance. The
impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act on the FAA thus depends on the latter two issues. See
id at 265.
304. See Lamson, supra note 301, at 264-70. Professor Lamson notes that "no cases . . .
hold that arbitration of claims is or is not the business of insurance." I at 265. He further
points out that a series of Supreme Court cases has narrowed the meaning of "business of

insurance" as used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act Id at 265-70 (discussing the cases). He
nonetheless concludes that "contractual arbitration of insurance claims indeed appears to be
the 'business of insurance.'" Id at 270.
305. See id. at 270 & nn.147-48.
306. For a sampling of state arbitration laws relating to insurance contracts, see infra
notes 311-12. For a comprehensive review of state statutory treatment of arbitration provisions
in insurance contracts, see Lamson, supra note 301, at 248-51.
307. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, CIV. A. No. 89-8796, 1991 WL 96677,
at -2-3 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1991), af'd, 953 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991); Lamson, supra note
301, at 271-72 and authorities cited therein.
308. See Washburn v. Corcoran, 643 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (holding that a
statute granting exclusive jurisdiction over the liquidation of insurance companies to the New
York Supreme Court is a law regulating the business of insurance and the McCarranFerguson Act precludes application of the FAA to remove claims involving insolvent insurers
from that court); In re Union Indem. Ins. Co., 521 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619-21 (Sup. CL 1987)

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

63

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:385

The extent to which general state arbitration laws supersede the
FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson Act depends on the language and
specificity of the state laws. General state arbitration laws that do not
mention insurance contracts specifically were not "enacted ... for the

purpose of regulating the business of insurance, " "9 and consequent3 t0
ly, they do not supersede the FAA even if they conflict with it.
A number of state arbitration laws do address insurance contracts
specifically. 311 Frequently, however, these statutes simply exempt
insurance contracts from the operation of the larger state arbitration
statute which makes arbitration agreements generally enforceable."

(holding that a statute which sets forth procedures for liquidation and dissolution of insurance
companies and which gives liquidation court exclusive jurisdiction of all claims involving the
insolvent insurer is a "state law regulating the business of insurance" under the MeCarranFerguson Act, and thus precludes application of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements
against the insolvent insurer).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
310. See Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1971); Hamilton Life
Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1969) (applying the
FAA because "[i]t
is quite plain that arbitration statutes, including those of Texas and New
York, are not statutes regulating the business of insurance, but statutes regulating the method
of handling contract disputes generally"). Even state arbitration statutes that preclude arbitration of personal injury claims or preclude enforcement of arbitration provisions in adhesion
contracts do not specifically regulate insurance, and thus probably do not prevent application
of the FAA to insurance contracts. See Lamson, supra note 301, at 274-75. For a review of
the exceptions contained in state arbitration statutes, see supra note 98.
311. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West 1972) (requiring the inclusion of an
arbitration provision in uninsured motorist policies); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-336(c) (1992)
(providing for arbitration of insurance coverage disputes); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, 1 755a(l)
(Supp. 1992) (requiring inclusion of arbitration provision in uninsured motorist coverage); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.20-050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (requiring that agreements to
arbitrate future disputes contained in automobile insurance policy not be binding on named
insured or any person claiming under him); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 111(D) (1987) (requiring inclusion of arbitration provision in uninsured motorist coverage); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 742.504(1)(a) (1991) (requiring inclusion of arbitration provision in uninsured motorist
coverage); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206H (Michie 1990) (prohibiting provisions that require
the insured to arbitrate uninsured motorist claims). For a comprehensive review of state
statutory treatment of arbitration provisions in insurance contracts, see Lamson, supra note
301, at 248-51.
312. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie 1987) (excluding claims by "any
insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract"); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-2 (6) (Cum. Supp. 1991) (excluding arbitration agreements relating to contracts of insurance); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(b)(1) (Supp. 1982) (excluding contracts of insurance); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050(2) (ichielBobbs-Merrill
1992) (excluding insurance contracts);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.350 (1992) (excluding enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future
disputes contained in insurance contracts); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (1979) (excluding
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes contained in insurance contracts); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-2602 (1989) (excluding enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future
disputes contained in adhesion contracts such as insurance contracts); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-
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This exemption from the operation of a generally applicable state
statute is scant basis on which to characterize the provision as a law
regulating the business of insurance. It does not regulate insurance
arbitration so much as leave it unregulated. Nonetheless, since state
arbitration statutes usually were passed to reverse common law refusal
to enforce arbitration agreements,
an explicit exclusion of insurance contracts from the effect of such
statutes indicates a legislative determination that such agreements are
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that such a statute constitutes state regulation of the business of insurance which... would be... impaired... by appli-

cation of the [FAA]. 313
No reported cases, however, have addressed the effect of such statutes
3 14
on the application of the FAA.
If state insurance laws do not preclude application of the FAA
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, of course, the FAA still applies to
insurance contracts only if they "involve" interstate commerce. Cases
applying the FAA's interstate commerce requirement to insurance
contracts are few. Several cases apply the FAA to reinsurance contracts between insurance companies.315 Most of these cases concern
agreements between companies in different states, and the courts thus

2 (1985) (enforcing arbitration agreements in insurance contracts against the insured only if
the arbitration provision is placed immediately above the testimoniunm clause or the parties'
signatures); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1978) (excluding "any insured...
under any insurance policy" from coverage of arbitration statute).
313. Lauson, supra note 301, at 273-74.
314. See Mutual Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 750 F. Supp.
455, 459-60 (D. Kan. 1990) (defendant argued that the FAA was inapplicable under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act because Kansas excluded contracts of insurance from its arbitration
statute; after reviewing cases addressing the interplay between the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
the FAA, the court avoided the issue by holding that the exclusion in the Kansas arbitration
statute did not apply to a reinsurance agreement), rev'd, 969 F.2d 931 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. CL 604 (1992).
315. Lamson, supra note 301, at 259-60; see also Life of Am. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1984); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969); Schacht v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 91 C 2228, 1991
WL 171377, at *5 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1991); Meadows Indem. Co., v. Baccala & Shoop
Ins. Sere., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 750 F.
Supp. at 462-63; American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Arion Ins. Co., No. 88 CIV. 1665, 1990
WL 52295, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. April 18, 1990); Usher Syndicate Ltd., Inc. v. Figgie Int'l, Inc.,
No. CIV. 87-1079, 1987 WL 19840, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 1987) (holding without dispute
that a contract between parties from different states for reinsurance of investor bonds issued
outside Florida to cover risks outside of Florida involves commerce under the FAA);
Ainsworth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 52, 55 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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find interstate commerce on that basis.3 16 Some courts also rely on
the fact that some of the insurance policies underlying the reinsurance
agreement were negotiated in more than one state.317 Two courts
even suggest that "the fact that the agreement involved insurance may
31 8
be enough to establish the interstate commerce connection."
Cases addressing the application of the FAA to individual insurance contracts, meanwhile, conflict. Several cases apply the FAA to
individual insurance contracts in which an insurance company issued
a policy to a resident of another state.319 One case, Downing v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 32' held the FAA inapplicable to an automobile insurance contract and the arbitration proceedings instituted to
settle a claim on it. Without saying specifically whether the policy
was issued in the insured's home state, the court in Downing stated
that the FAA applies only to contracts "'evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce.' The contract involved in this case
does not evidence such a transaction. Every event relevant to this
321
case took place in Michigan."
No reported cases address the applicability of the FAA to individual "insurance contract[s] issued to a resident of the same state in
3 22
which the insurance company has its principal place of business."

316. See Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 750 F. Supp. at 462-63; Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v.
Natl Risk Underwriters, Inc., No. CIV. A. 87-1844, 1987 WL 14806, at *8 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 15, 1987); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 225
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aft'd, 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
317. See Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 750 F. Supp. at 462-63; Ainsworth, 634 F. Supp.
at 55.
318. Mutual Reinsurance Bureau, 750 F. Supp. at 462-63; see also Ainsworth, 634 F.
Supp. at 55.
319. See Miller v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1979); Hart v.
Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying the FAA to an occupational
disability insurance policy where the insured applied for the insurance in Montana, the insurer
accepted the policy in Illinois, and the insurer delivered the policy to the insured in Montana); West Shore Pipe Line Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv. Ltd., 791 F. Supp.
200, 202 (N.D. M11.
1992); New Castle County v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp.
318 (D. Del. 1989); Overseas Private Inv. Corp. v. Anaconda Co., 418 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.
1976) (applying the FAA to a contract to insure business assets in Chile without discussing
the commerce issue); Lamson, supra note 301, at 260-61; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Patterson, No. CIV. A. 89-8796, 1991 WL 96677, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1991)
(holding that an automobile insurance contract between a Pennsylvania resident and an Ohio
insurer involved commerce under the FAA, but pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
FAA did not apply), aft'd, 953 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991).
320. 335 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), vacated in part, 355 N.W.2d 111 (Mich.
1984).
321. Id at 141 (alteration in original) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
322. Lamson, supra note 301, at 261.
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Again, the FAA likely applies to such contracts if the broad "affect3 a3 but its applicabiliing" commerce standard applies in FAA cases,
324
ty is less certain if narrower standards apply.
7.

Contracts for the Sale or Lease of Land, Interests in
Land, and Fixtures
The sale of land or an interest in land would seem to be an
essentially local transaction, especially when all parties to the transfer
reside in the state where the land is located. Such transactions in land
presumably "affect" interstate commerce, but reasonable arguments
can be made that they do not "involve" interstate commerce if narrower interpretations are applied. Cases addressing the applicability of
the FAA to land transactions are rare, and the few cases that address
the issue conflict.
Several courts have held that transactions conveying interests in
land do not involve commerce under the FAA. 3 ' Even when the
transaction contains some interstate elements, several courts still have
held the FAA inapplicable. One court, for example, held that a contract granting an easement to a pipeline company did not involve
interstate commerce.326 Another held that a surface mining lease
between citizens of different states which required interstate lease
payments did not involve interstate commerce.327
In Riverfront Properties, Ltd. v. Max Factor 111,321 the court

held that the FAA did not apply to an agreement between joint owners of property to use the property as security for a loan. The proper-

323. See id. at 261-62.

324. Automobile insurance contracts and other types of insurance that provide coverage
even when the insured person or property is in another state might "involve" commerce
under any standard.
325. See Riess v. Murchison, 329 F.2d 635, 644 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that a contract
for the sale of land does not involve commerce under FAA), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966). But see Berhorst v. J.L. Mason of Mo., Inc., 764 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Mo., CL App.
1988) (applying that FAA where one of the parties initially argued that the FAA did not
apply to the sale of a house, but where the parties later agreed that the contract involved
commerce and that the FAA applied).
326. See Becker v. Amoco Pipeline Co., No. 89 C 1732, 1989 WL 118238, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 25, 1989) (holding that a contract granting pipeline company an easement across
land did not involve interstate commerce under the FAA). But see Texas E. Transmission
Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123, 127-28 (E.D. Ky. 1959) (holding that a contract granting
a pipeline company an easement across land involved interstate commerce under the FAA),
rev'd, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).
327. See AJ. Taft Coal Co. v. Randolph, 602 So. 2d 395, 397 (Ala. 1992).
328. 460 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984).
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ty in that case was located in Florida, and the contract was between
the owners, who resided in California. The agreement provided that
the land in question would be used to secure a four million dollar
loan from a bank in Florida. It further provided that the loan proceeds would be disbursed in California, and it required that payments
on the loan be made to the Florida bank 329 The court nonetheless
concluded that the agreement, as distinguished from the loan transaction with the bank, did "not contemplate substantial interstate activity." 31° While it recognized that the agreement contemplated some
interstate activity, it said that the "agreement, considered in its entirety, does not evince
the degree of interstate activity necessary to in331
voke the [FAA].
Other cases, meanwhile, have applied the FAA to a variety of
transactions in land and fixtures. Several courts have suggested that
"[a]rbitration provisions in leases of real property are enforceable
under the [FAA] if the leases' purpose is to either generate or affect
activity in interstate commerce."332 Courts have thus applied the
FAA to shopping mall leases, 333 contracts granting easements for

pipelines,3 4 contracts for the purchase of fast food stores, 335 min37
ing leases, 33 and contracts for the joint use of utility poles.
329. Prior to the litigation, the Florida bank was acquired by a bank based in North
Carolina.
330. Riverfront Properties, 460 So. 2d at 953.
331. Id.at 954; see also Wald v. Tauber, No. CV-86-3104, 1987 WL 19425, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1987) (holding that a partnership agreement between citizens of different
states which is restricted to real estate activities in New York does not involve interstate
commerce).

332. Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Ky. 1984).
333. See Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, F.&P. R.R. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1311-12
(D.D.C. 1981) (applying the FAA to a contract under which a D.C. corporation leased land
in Virginia from a Virginia corporation because (Ji) the lease contemplated extensive commercial development serving the interstate metropolitan D.C. area; (ii) the lease contemplated a
construction project that required interstate movement of materials and personnel; (iii) the
lease was executed subject to proposals by public authorities for construction of interstate
mass transit facilities; and (iv) the lease contained provisions requiring the lessee to maintain
easements for the operation of the lessor's interstate railroad).
334. See Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123, 127-28 (S.D. Ky.
1959) (holding that a contract granting pipeline company an easement across land involved
interstate commerce under the FAA), rev'd, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960). But see Becker,
1989 WL 118238, at *1 (holding that a contract granting pipeline company an easement
across land did not involve interstate commerce under FAA).
335. See Neal v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying the
FAA, the court construed an arbitration agreement in a franchise licensing contract to include
disputes arising from a separate purchase agreement under which the franchisee purchased the
land, buildings, and personal property that comprised six fast food stores).
336. See Kodak Mining Co., 669 S.W.2d at 920 (applying the FAA to coal mining lease

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/3

68

Strickland: The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Requirement: Wh
1992]

FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

Again, the applicability depends on whether the court construes the
FAA to exercise the full extent of Congress's commerce power or
only some portion of that power.33
8. Corporate Acquisition Agreements
The applicability of the FAA has arisen in relatively few contracts for the sale of corporations or corporate assets, but all reported
cases apply the FAA. Two cases held that the sale of a corporation
or its assets involves interstate commerce when the corporation itself
is engaged in interstate commerce.339 Likewise, a court applied the
FAA to a corporate acquisition contract between citizens of different
states.' There apparently are no reported cases addressing the applicability of the FAA to the sale of a local business between citizens
of the same state.

because "mining activity amotnts to transactions in interstate commerce7 even if the coal is
"mined and sold entirely intrastate"); see also Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding that the FAA applies to the sale of an undivided one-half interest in mining
claims where the parties reside in different states and the sales contract also provided for the
development and operation of the claims and disbursement of the proceeds). The court in
Foster summarized the interstate activity as follows:
The agreement required Foster [the Oregon resident] to make a substantial down
payment to Turley [the New Mexico resident], and required Turley to remit proceeds from the mining operation to Foster. Some ore from the mines was milled at
facilities outside the state of New Mexico and the parties attempted to market their
product all over the country. At one point Foster sent truck transportation from
Oregon to haul the ore from the mines. In view of the interstate payments between
the parties and the interstate nature of the production and marketing involved, we
conclude that the agreement here is clearly within the ambit of the [FAA].
I4 at 40. But see AJ. Taft Coal Co. v. Randolph, 602 So. 2d 395, 397 (Ala. 1992) (holding
that a lease of surface mining rights did not involve commerce even though parties were
from different states and payments were to be mailed interstate).
337. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 221 F. Supp.
364, 367-68 (D. La. 1963) (holding that the FAA applies to a contract for the joint use of
utility poles because one of the parties has extensive interstate operations).
338. Compare Riverfront Properties, Ltd. v. Max Factor m1,460 So. 2d 948, 954 (Fla.
DisL Ct. App. 1984), with Kodak Mining, 669 S.W.2d at 920.
339. See Middleby Corp. v. Hussman Corp., No. 90 C 2744, 1990 WL 103236, at *2
(N.D.Ill. July 16, 1990) (applying the FAA to an asset purchase contract involving the sale
of six divisions of a corporation engaged in nationwide business); Singer v. Tappan, 403 F.
Supp. 322 (D.NJ. 1975) (wherein parties agree that a contract for the purchase of several
divisions of a corporation doing business nationally involves commerce under the FAA).
340. See Steele v. Control Fluidics, Inc., No. CIV. A. 84-3814, 1985 WL 4299, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1985) (holding that a contract between a New York corporation and a
Pennsylvania resident for the sale in Pennsylvania of the assets of a Pennsylvania corporation
in exchange for stock and an employment contract is commerce under the FAA).
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9. Loan Agreements
Litigants have disputed the applicability of the FAA in relatively
few reported cases concerning loan agreements. The FAA certainly
applies to loan agreements between citizens of different states. 4 ' It
also applies to loans that fund interstate commercial projects. 4 2 No
reported cases address the applicability of the FAA to consumer loans
transacted between citizens of the same state.
IV.

COMMENTARY ON EXISTING CASE LAW AND
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

A.

Problems with the Existing Case Law

As the foregoing survey demonstrates, case law on the FAA's
commerce requirement is ambiguous and erratic. Most
courts-particularly federal courts-apply the FAA expansively to all
transactions that "affect" interstate commerce. Even courts that do not
expressly apply that standard generally give the Act broad application.
Such expansive application of the FAA sweeps away huge bodies of
state arbitration law, including state arbitration statutes enacted in the
last several years.4 3
Neither the Supreme Court'
nor Congress, 4s meanwhile,

341. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Todd, 568 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D.Md. 1983) (holding
that a personal guarantee contract involved interstate commerce where a Maryland guarantor
assured payment to a New York creditor).
342. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., No.
CIV. A. 83-2809, 1989 WL 52480, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1989) (holding that a construction loan from a national bank for a hotelicondorninium project containing materials from
around the world involved commerce under the FAA), aft'd, 891 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1989).
343. Georgia enacted the Georgia Arbitration Code, for example, in 1988. See GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to 9-9-3 (Cum. Supp. 1992). It made arbitration agreements generally enforceable, but it excepted a number of different types of contracts and disputes that the Georgia
legislature apparently believed should not be arbitrated. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2). The statute and its exceptions would be
meaningless if the FAA broadly applies to all contracts and transactions "affecting" interstate
commerce. Consumer financing agreements, contracts for the purchase of consumer goods,
contracts relating to the purchase and financing of residential real estate, and probably oven
agreements to arbitrate future tort claims-all of which the Georgia Code excludes from
arbitration-"affect" interstate commerce and would be arbitrated under the FAA if that
standard applies.
344. See supra notes 146-64 and accompanying text.
345. The FAA's use of the "involving commerce" language rather than the usual "affecting commerce" language suggests a narrower scope of application for the FAA. See THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 950 (3d ed. 1992). It defines

"involve" as follows: "To contain as a part; include." It defines "affect" as follows: "To have
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have given clear authority for such complete displacement of state
law. A number of courts thus construe the FAA's applicability less
broadly, with some articulating standards to determine its applicability.346 The enactment of state arbitration statutes, many in the past
several years, indicates that many state legislatures likewise perceive
the scope of the FAA's applicability to be more limited than that of
most federal commerce legislation.'
The existence of these conflicting approaches to the FAA, and
the unpredictability of the interstate commerce inquiry, frustrate the
central policy of the statute, i.e., to provide an expeditious and efficient extra-judicial process for settling disputes with minimal judicial
involvement."4s Conflicting interpretations of the FAA's commerce
requirement create doubt about the Act's applicability to a particular
contract or transaction. This uncertainty is compounded by the factbased nature of the "involving" commerce inquiry, which often requires case-by-case evaluation." 9 The uncertainty and unpredictability of the FAA's applicability in turn spurs litigation over the FAA's
applicability, whenever a party to an arbitration agreement wants to
avoid arbitration or decides that state law is more favorable to his or
her case. This litigation, moreover, can only increase as the federal
courts expand the federal common law of arbitration that accompanies
the FAA, 35 0 thereby increasing the differences between federal and
an influence on or effect a change in." Id. at 29. More importantly, the legislative history of
the FAA reveals no indication that Congress intended to supplant state arbitration law nor
even an awareness that state law would be affected. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, J., concurring), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 817 (1961); Atwood, supra note 8, at 79; Hirshman, supra note 4, at 1315 ("Little
emerges from the legislative history other than unhappiness with prior law.. ...); Note,
Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights,
Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L. 847, 863 (1960); see also authorities cited
supra in note 34. Furthermore, contemporary commentators did not perceive an intent to
affect state law. See supra note 34.
346. See supra notes 176-206 and accompanying text.
347. Many states include in their arbitration statutes provisions which are meaningless if
the FAA applies to all transactions "affecting7 interstate commerce. Some state arbitration
statutes, for example, preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements in consumer transactions. See supra note 97. The FAA would preempt these and similar state provisions if the
FAA's commerce requirement is interpreted expansively, because consumer transactions
"affect" interstate commerce under modem interpretations of the commerce power.
348. Judge Lumbard articulated this purpose of the FAA in Metro Industrial, 287 F.2d at
387 (Lumbard, 3., concurring).
349. See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 387
F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1967).
350. For a discussion of this expanding federal common law of arbitration, see supra part
I.E.
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51

In order to fulfill the FAA's goal of providing expeditious enforcement of arbitration agreements, a predictable "bright line" rule is
needed for determining when a transaction "involves" interstate commerce. This rule must come from the United States Supreme Court or
Congress. Even a consensus among the federal courts of appeal would
likely be insufficient. Since the FAA does not create federal jurisdiction, 352 numerous FAA cases are heard in state courts. The cases in
state court, moreover, are the ones most likely to create litigation
over the FAA's applicability, since they typically involve citizens of

the same state or small transactions.2 In the absence of Supreme
Court precedent on the issue, state courts apparently perceive themselves free to pursue their own theories of the FAA's applicability.
B. Possible Judicial Solutions
The Supreme Court could partially solve the problem by definitively adopting one of the existing standards for applying the FAA's
commerce requirement or articulating a new intermediate standard.
Application of a uniform standard would certainly reduce the uncertainty and thus the litigation concerning the Act's applicability. The
existing standards, as well as likely new standards, however, are all
problematic.
The Court could adopt Judge Lumbard's "contemplation of substantial interstate activity" test.3 4 This test, however, is unpredictable and thus invites litigation. Not only are inquiries into the parties'
state of mind necessarily ambiguous, but they also entail the use of
evidence other than the contract itself. In addition to the terms of the
contract, parties can introduce "evidence as to how the parties expect-

351. For a discussion of the many differences between federal and state arbitration law,
see supra part H.
352. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983).
353. If they involved citizens of different states and sums in excess of $50,000, of
course, these cases likely would find their way into federal court on diversity jurisdiction.
Substantial contracts between citizens of different states likely involve interstate commerce
even under narrower interpretations of the FAA.
354. Under that test, the court inquires "whether, at the time [the parties] entered into [a
contract containing an arbitration provision], they contemplated substantial interstate activity."
Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard,
J.,concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961). If they did, then the FAA applies. For a
discussion of Judge Lumbard's test and a review of its application and adoption by other
courts, see supra notes 175-200 and accompanying text.
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ed the contract to be performed and how it was performed ....
This test thus invites conflicting, self-serving testimony about the
parties' expectations, which requires a factual hearing to resolve.
Moreover, once the court determines that the parties contemplated
interstate activity, the court still must make the ambiguous determination whether the contemplated interstate activity was sufficiently "substantial" to invoke the FAA. Courts have reached widely varying
conclusions on this issue.3
Judge Lumbard's test is also troublesome because it is not securely grounded in the language of the FAA. He fashioned the test to
inquire into the parties' state of mind because the purpose of the
FAA is to give effect to the parties' contractual intent expressed in
arbitration provisions.3 57 Just because the FAA seeks to give effect
to the parties intent to arbitrate, however, does not mean that the
applicability of the FAA should also depend on the parties' expectations. Parties to contracts likely do not think about whether a contract
entails interstate or intrastate activity. They think about obtaining an
advantageous exchange. Surely the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements relating to interstate commerce should not be frustrated just because of the parties' subjective failure to perceive the interstate aspects of the transaction. 8
Given the difficulties with Judge Lumbard's test, the Court could
opt for a more objective standard. Such a standard could take one of
two forms: (1) it could inquire whether the performance of the contract at issue actually entailed substantial interstate activity; or (2) it
could inquire whether, at the time the contract was entered, a reasonable person would have expected the contract to entail substantial
interstate activity.
These options, however, have their own problems. The first
option is unfair because it would allow one party to control the
choice of law. Even if performance of a contract did not require
interstate activity, a party could unilaterally engage in interstate activity in performing his or her duties under the contract, thereby invok-

355. Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 387.
356. See authorities cited supra note 200.
357. Metro Indus., 287 F.2d at 386-87.
358. See C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F.
Supp. 446, 450 (M.D.N.C. 1974) C[S]ubjective intent of the parties [entering into an agreement containing an arbitration clause] is not controlling in determining if the agreement
objectively evidences a transaction involving commerce, but it is illuminating as to how the
parties interpreted their own contract.").
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ing the FAA. Option (2), the reasonable person standard, would be
more equitable, and it is more securely rooted in the language of the
FAA. Neither of these tests, however, provide the predictability needed to discourage litigation concerning the applicability of the FAA.
They are still fact-based standards that would require an independent
determination in every close case. Therefore, they would not significantly further the FAA's goal of expeditiously enforcing arbitration
agreements.
Finally, the Court could adopt the "affecting" interstate commerce test or some similarly expansive standard. Such an expansive
standard would provide the predictability needed to accomplish the
FAA's efficiency goal. As indicated by the courts' decisions on
Congress's commerce power in other contexts, every transaction (or
nearly every transaction) affects interstate commerce. Universal application of this standard in FAA cases, therefore, would result in the
FAA's clear applicability to every commercial contract and transaction
and perhaps even every contract and transaction. Application of this
standard would thus discourage litigation of the Act's applicability. If
the issue were raised, it could in most cases be easily determined in
minimal time.
The "affecting commerce" standard, however, has other problems.
First, application of the "affecting commerce" standard arguably
would require overruling Bernhardt.359 The contract in that case on
its face contemplated Bernhardt's moving from New York to Vermont
to be the superintendent of a factory there.3" Although the Court
stated in Bernhardt that "[t]here was no showing that the petitioner ... was engaging in activity that affected commerce,"361 it is
hard to perceive the contract as not affecting commerce under modern
notions of the commerce power or even those of 1956.362 Second,
application of the "affecting commerce" standard would displace the
extensive body of state arbitration law. Such extensive preemption of
state law should come from Congress with some clarity. 63 As noted
359. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bernhardt, see supra notes 14951 and accompanying text.
360. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956).
361. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956).
362. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding an application of federal
quotas to a small amount of wheat that a farmer grew on his own land to be consumed on
his own farm, because it affected interstate commerce).
363. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386 (2d
Cir.) (Lumbard, 3., concurring), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961).
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above, however, the FAA does not evince any congressional intent to
affect state law, much less an intent to displace a substantial body of
state contract law.3"
Last, and perhaps most important, this complete preemption of
state arbitration law would sweep aside the widespread concerns of
state legislatures about the use of arbitration in such contexts as personal injury claims, consumer contracts, and adhesion contracts. Many
state statutes that provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements expressly do not apply to one or more of these types of conRegardless of the source or the wisdom of
tracts or disputes.'
these exceptions, these statutes embody the policy decision of state
legislatures that while arbitration agreements generally should be
enforced, their enforcement in certain contexts carries certain dangers
and evils. In enacting the FAA, Congress did not consider the problems that are peculiar to arbitration agreements in these contexts.
Congress enacted the FAA in 1926, apparently expecting it to apply
only in federal court.3" Consumer disputes (and other disputes that
are the subject of special consideration in state arbitration statutes)
were unlikely to find their way to federal court in 1926, because they
seldom involved citizens of more than one state and they usually did
not meet the requisite amount in controversy. Indeed, Congress may
have considered such disputes beyond its commerce power in 1925.
Although these state statutes are preempted by the FAA now when
the transaction entails interstate activity, judicial application of the
"affecting commerce" standard would remove the only legislative
treatment of these policy concerns.
C. A Legislative Solution
The best way to provide the predictability needed for expeditious
enforcement of arbitration agreements while at the same time addressing the perceived problems of arbitrating tort claims, consumer disputes and other areas of special state concern is for Congress to
amend the FAA. First, Congress should amend § 2 of the Act to
make it applicable to all transactions "affecting commerce." Second, it
should expressly exclude from the Act's coverage those disputes or
subjects that it concludes should be decided judicially. Last, it should
expressly exclude the disputes and subjects it concludes should be left
364. See supra note 345.
365. See supra notes 97-98.
366. See supra note 34.
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for state regulation.
By adopting the "affecting commerce" language, Congress would
make clear that the FAA applies to all contracts and transactions. In
light of the courts' liberal interpretation of that phrase in the past,
there would be no doubt about the intended scope of the Act's applicability. This amendment would thus end much of the current litigation about the FAA's applicability.
While making this change, Congress could consider the need for
special provisions relating to arbitration of certain kinds of disputes. It
could consider the need perceived by many state legislatures, for
example, for special notice provisions to apply to arbitration provisions in consumer contracts or adhesion contracts. 3" It could consider the merit of precluding enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
tort or personal injury claims arising after execution of the agreement.
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Finally, Congress could leave certain decisions concerning arbitration to the states. It could provide that the broadly applicable FAA
does not apply to such areas of traditional state concern as divorce,
child custody, and support agreements. Alternatively, it could provide
that the FAA governs those areas as it does any other contract or
transaction, unless the state whose substantive law governs the dispute
specifically precludes or regulates arbitration of those designated types
of disputes. It could do the same with consumer contracts, adhesion
contracts, and contracts for arbitration of tort claims.
Regardless of whether Congress deems such special provisions
necessary, a well-drafted amendment would make the applicability of
the FAA more certain, while assuring that these policy concerns receive attention before being swept aside. Congress apparently did not
consider these issues before enacting the FAA in its current version.
Consequently, expansive judicial interpretation of the FAA-while
perhaps justified by the statute's judicial history and beneficial to the
FAA's goal of expeditious arbitration enforcement-would preempt
state laws that address these issues without the issues having been
considered at the federal level. Federal lawmakers should at least
consider the issues before federal law sweeps away state legislation
addressing them.

367. For state legislation on this point, see supra notes 97-98, 102-04.
368. For state legislation on this point, see supra notes 97-98.
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